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The Crisis of Secular Liberalism and the
Constitutional State in Comparative
Perspective: Religion, Rule of Law,
and Democratic Organization
of Religion Privileging States
Larry Catá Backer†
Religion has returned to the secular state; does crisis result? Conflating variations of Marxist-Leninist states, whose godless communism” of
the 20th century sought to marginalize religion as a political adversary,
with the Westphalian state that sought to avoid sectarian conflict by separating the institutional state from the apparatus of religion, modern secular
liberal theory has long problematized the role of religion in modern “secular” states. Critics of secular liberal modernity never fully accepted its
premises and “post” modernists have sought to undo to “reform” the structures of secular liberalism to provide for a larger space for “religion” in
politics and economics. This Article considers the issue of the “return” of
religion from a comparative constitutional perspective. Its central premise
is that where institutional religion is both protected and engaged in political life through which it seeks to harmonize institutional state and religious government, the resulting system tends to advantage a privileged
religion in political life over its political rivals. This has implications for the
way in which the fundamental ordering premises of liberal societies are
understood and applied— rule of law, direct democracy, popular sovereignty, the protection of foreigners and the approaches to the interpretation
of constitutional text. These implications contain lessons that might be
considered by the United States as it seeks to carve a privileged role for
religion while protecting its status as something special that cannot be
touched by politics. The Article develops this thesis by weaving together
several stories from developing and developed states where religion has
acquired a more privileged role. These illustrate the ways that blasphemy
and apostasy laws and the incorporation of religious values skew the
† W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor
of International Affairs 2013– 14 Immediate Past Chair University Faculty Senate,
Pennsylvania State University. Presented at the Conference, “Law and Human Rights in
a Post-Secular World,” Mississippi College School of Law, March 28– 29, 2014. An earlier
version of this paper was first presented for a panel entitled, “An Existential Crisis for
Secular Liberalism” at the 2013 Law & Society Association Annual Conference, May 31,
2013, Boston, Massachusetts. My great thanks to Mark Modak Truran, Mississippi
College, who organized a great panel and led the lively discussion.
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nature and application of the rule of law, the nature and limits of direct
democracy, the relationship between apostasy and treason, the language of
interpretation and the power to participate in that dialogue, and the role of
the foreign or minority. The effect is especially pronounced in states formally organized on global secular liberal principles of neutral and tolerant
process and values neutrality. It suggests a context for the insight, at the
center of secular liberalism’s solicitude for religion, that where the apparatus of institutional religion seeks to enter into the political life of a state its
religious beliefs ought not to be accorded any particular deference. It will
suggest the nature of the shocks to the constitutional settlement of the U.S.
Constitution and its now misunderstood model of secularism, which
touches on the construction of a shadow religious state within American
secular liberalism. To that end the Supreme Court decision in Hobby Lobby
is considered in light of the prior discussion. The Article concludes that for
secular liberalism the price of preserving the privileging of the practices
and autonomy of religion in a multi-religious state is the disbarring of institutional religion (though not religious values) from organized political life.
The alternative, privileging (institutional) religion and permitting it a
broad institutional right to participate in politics, is very much in evidence
abroad.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
I. Social Will Through Law, Rule of Law, and Religion—
Blasphemy Law in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
II. Popular Democracy and Religion— Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
III. Popular Democracy, Religion, and Tolerating the
Foreigner— Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
IV. Apostasy, Treason, Political Community and Religion in
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
V. The Interpretive Community in Theocratic States— Iran
and Its Priestly Caste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
VI. Echoes of Religious Privilege in Pluralist States: The
Contradictions of Privilege and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Introduction
For a long time before the modern era, the relationship between religion and politics was well-settled and easy to understand. While the religious establishment was formally distinct from the political apparatus of
government,1 and each was organized according to its own logic, it was
undisputed that every political unity was expected to and could be legiti1. Government is understood as an apparatus in the sense described in Giorgio
Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, in WHAT IS AN APPARATUS? AND OTHER ESSAYS 1– 24
(David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, trans., Werner Hamacher, ed., Stanford University
Press, 2009)

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

2015

unknown

Seq: 3

1-JUL-15

14:18

The Crisis of Secular Liberalism

53

mated only through an official religious establishment.2 That religious
establishment also was woven into the government of a state and provided
substantive constraints on governmental power.3 But all began to change
with the great wars of religion in Europe, and accelerated with the establishment of the United States and Republican France in the late 18th
century.4
“The result of this disestablishment is a deep and enduring deprivileging of
Religion as a normative basis for decision making. Religion is relegated to
object. As such, it is inconceivable to think of Religion as part of the grammar of law. ‘If an unspoken and irregular but nonetheless powerful prohibition excluding religion from public and especially legal discourse has been
in effect for some time, then those of us who are interested in “law and
religion” need to pay attention to that phenomenon.’ ”5

Today, Western-style democratic republics pride themselves on a normative structure for political organization grounded in the formal disestablishment of religion and protection of religious belief, practices,
sensibilities, and institutions within these democratic polities.6 In one
form or another, this forms the basic template for national and international human rights, whether in national constitutions7 or in international
instruments.8
Yet the disestablishment-privileging project of secular liberalism is
breaking down. There have been tremendous efforts over the last half-century to re-privilege religion and religious values as an integral part of democratic discourse, while also strengthening the privileging the institutions of
religions and religious belief within the organization of the state and its
2. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary, “Which Countries Have State
Religions?” QUARTERLY J, OF ECON., 2005, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
rachelmccleary/files/state_religion.pdf.
3. Thus ancient states were constituted from its three estates, clergy, nobility and
everyone else. See, e.g., J. RUSSELL MAJOR, THE DEPUTIES TO THE ESTATES GENERAL IN RENAISSANCE FRANCE (1974). These together constituted not just the political, but the social
order itself. The U.K. Parliament represents an advanced form of this approach. See, e.g.,
Gavin Drewry and Jenny Brock, Prelates in Parliament, PARLIAM AFF 24(3): 222– 50
(1971).
4. See, e.g., Boisi Cntr. Papers on Religion in the United States, Separation of Church
and State, 1, available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/
bc_papers/BCP-ChurchState.pdf; Hosack, Kristen A. (2010) “Napoleon Bonaparte’s
Concordat and the French Revolution,” Constructing the Past: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol11/iss1/5
5. Larry Catá Backer, Religion as Object and the Grammar of Law, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
229, 229– 30 (1998) (citing in part Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto
Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 203, 227 (1998)).
6. See, e.g., Jose Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective, THE QUARTERLY J. OF ECON., (Spring / Summer 2006), available at http://www.iascculture.org/THR/archives/AfterSecularization/8.12CCasanova.pdf.
7. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (Basic Law), Oct.
2010, BGBl. 1– 20 (Ger.), translated by Christian Tomuschat & David P. Currie.
8. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948. For a contemporary account see H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 354 (1948). .
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political life.9 Modern critics of secular liberalism have long condemned
two trends that in different ways effectively limited the role of religion in
modern “secular” states. The first was variations of “godless communism”
of the 20th century, producing states that marginalized religion and religious values as something autonomous, competitive, and alien to the state
and to the project of state building.10 The second was grounded in a conflict avoidance premise of secular liberalism extracted from notions of the
Westphalian state that sought to avoid sectarian conflict by separating the
institutional state from the apparatus of religion.11
In addition, even as the last half-millennium has seen the progressive
detachment of religion from politics, it has also seen the rise in liberal democratic states of a growing movement to permit active participation of institutional religion in politics.12 Moreover, Western liberal democracies have
contributed their militaries and national wealth to the creation of states,
democratic in form, in which the core political and substantive values are
grounded in the religious beliefs and practices of religion— that is of a dominant religion.13 Simultaneously, in both democratic Western-style states
and theocratic democracies, an equally strong movement has emerged that
means to extend the traditional protection of religion against attack, even
when religious institutions directly participate in political debate.14
Grounded in the West on the horrors of religious persecution of Jews in
Europe, the normative systems of protection of religion appear now to have
become an instrument to protect (usually majority) religions in their political activities in many secular liberal states.15 In the West, this movement
has been used more and more to insulate religion and religiously based
agendas from criticism, even as organized religion more aggressively participates in political life cloaked in the protections afforded to “religion.”16
These activities point to an important version of the existential crisis
of secular liberalism, its angst, and the emergence of transitions away from
9. See, e.g., Rajeev Bhargava, States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism,
OpenDemocracy.net, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/rajeev-bhargava/
states-religious-diversity-and-crisis-of-secularism-0, last visited 11/17/2014.
10. And perhaps there was something to this. See, e.g., Jane Barnes and Helen
Whitney, John Paul II and the Fall of Communism, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/pope/communism/.
11. Famously, in the United States, see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
12. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The “Paradoxical” Relationship Between Religion and
Liberal Democracy in the United States, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/sela/SELA11_Schuck_CV_Eng_20110413.pdf.
13. See Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New
Legal Global Ordering, 16(1) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85– 172 (2009).
14. See, e.g., id. at 163– 64.
15. See GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE, RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL CONFLICT IN
AMERICA (2001); Paul A. Djupe1 & J. Tobin Grant, Religious Institutions and Political Participation in America, 40(2) J. SCI. STUD. RELIG. 303– 14 (2001).
16. For a criticism, see Using Religion to Discriminate, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/using-religion-discriminate. See Adam Serwer, Arizona
Passes Law Allowing Discrimination, MSNBC (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/
msnbc/arizona-passes-law-allowing-discrimination.
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the model.17 On the one hand, Western elites continue to cultivate a broad
solicitude for religion— not merely as individual belief but as an organized
force with institutional life.18 On the other, the West is increasingly willing
to admit to (or unable to prevent) the participation of religion in political
life— but protects religion against political attack even as organized religion actively injects itself into the give and take of political contests.19 At
the international level, this is evidenced in the continuing efforts to develop
a consensus among the community of states that would constitutionalize
religious solicitude in the form of prohibitions against insulting or
blaspheming religion and its sacred objects and habits.20 At the domestic
level, it is evidenced by a greater willingness to permit the secular state to
be organized within frameworks of religious values.21 It has produced a
profound, and profoundly disturbing national discussion on the nature of
the U.S. military intervention abroad and its character within the nation as
it pursues a national security agenda.22 Indeed, the existential crisis has
proceeded to the stage of an inversion of sorts, where it appears to have
17. As a recent conference overview describes it:
The “return of religion” has resulted in an existential crisis for secular liberalism. Vigorous debate now centers on what it means for the state and the law to be “secular” or even
whether secular neutrality is possible. Critical perspectives on law have put into question the professed neutrality and universality of law, but discussion of the “secular” and
secularism focus mainly on redefining those terms without considering the historical
connection between law and religion, without defining religion, and without reexamining the nature of law and human rights. In other words, even with these widespread
debates, contemporary conceptions of law and human rights remain essentially
untouched and intact.
Conference, Law and Human Rights in a Post-Secular World, Mississippi College School of
Law (Mar. 28– 29, 2014), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/report-on-conference-law-and-human.html.
18. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. 21B (1993).
19. See PIPPA NORRIS AND RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION AND
POLITICS WORLDWIDE 3– 4 (2012).
20. See Laws Penalizing Blasphemy, Apostasy and Defamation of Religion are Widespread, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/11/21/
laws-penalizing-blasphemy-apostasy-and-defamation-of-religion-are-widespread/.
21. See, e.g. Was America Founded as a Christian Nation?, FORBES MAGAZINE (Sept. 25,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billflax/2012/09/25/was-america-founded-as-achristian-nation/3/.
22. Consider this in the context of the controversy in early 20’15 about the religious
character of the objects of the U.S. struggle against terrorism. See, Kevin Liptak, War on
Islam vs. War on the Islamic State: In Obama’s Words, CNN, Feb. 19, 2015. Available
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/politics/isis-obama-islamic-terror/index.html (“The
White House is also following precedent: in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror
attacks, former President George W. Bush said he wasn’t waging a “campaign against
the Muslim faith.” “Ours is a campaign against evil,” he said. Obama echoed those words
Wednesday when he said the U.S. is “not at war with Islam, we are at war with those who
have perverted Islam.”“). Within these contexts, religion is bounded by its conformity to
a set of behavior parameters, and those that fall outside of them are recast as violent
ideologies that can spring form a variety of normative premises. See, Idea that West Is at
War with Islam an ‘Ugly Lie’, Obama Says, FRANCE 24, Feb. 19, 2015, available at http://
www.france24.com/en/20150219-obama-war-islam-ugly-lie-extremism-summit-whitehouse/ (“The talks were aimed at establishing ways to stop violent ideologies from taking root in vulnerable communities across the world – from the growth of Boko Haram
in Nigeria to Islamic extremists in the Middle East and Asia.”).
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produced an age in which the global order determines the legitimacy of
religion by their suitability for engagement in global politics.23 This movement is not confined to Western secular liberal democracies.24
This Article considers the issue of the “return” of religion from a comparative constitutional perspective. Its central premise is that where institutional religion is both protected and engaged in political life, and where
institutional religion seeks to harmonize institutional state and religious
government, religion tends to advantage a privileged religion in political
life over its political rivals. This has implications for the way in which the
fundamental ordering premises of liberal societies are understood and
applied— rule of law, direct democracy, popular sovereignty, the protection
of foreigners, and the approaches to the interpretation of constitutional
text. These implications contain lessons that the United States might consider as it seeks to carve out a privileged role for religion while also protecting religion’s status as something special that cannot be touched by
politics.25 This Article declines to consider faith as held by the individual,
but rather focuses on the institutional and rule making structures of organized religion as institutional actors in the political arena that can simultaneously appear as an object of state protection, and as an important subject
of political organizations.26
23. Compare Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC March 2015,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-reallywants/384980/ with Murtaza Hussain, The Atlantic Ignores Muslim Intellectuals, Defines
‘True Islam’ as ISIS, THE INTERCEPT, Feb. 20, 2015, available at https://firstlook.org/
theintercept/2015/02/20/atlantic-defines-real-islam-says-isis/.
24. The Constitution of Pakistan was amended, effective January 7, 2015, to exclude
from certain constitutional protections in criminal trials for persons who “claims or is
known, to belong to any terrorist group or organization using the name of religion or a
sect.” Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015, Passed by the National Assembly: January 6, 2015, Passed by the Senate: January 6, 2015, Presidential Assent
Received: January 7, 2015 available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/
amendments/21amendment.html.
25. The problem, as it has been framed in the United States, requires creating a wall
of separation between the people who act in the name of or under their belief in a way of
engaging with religion, with the religion itself, understood as a system autonomous of its
adherents. That was the point President Obama sought to press in recent discussions
about the religious nature of engagement with theocratic groups seeking political power.
““No religion is responsible for terrorism — people are responsible for violence and terrorism,” Obama told delegates at the White House Summit on Countering Violent
Extremism.” David Jackson, Obama: No Religion is Responsible for Terrorism, USA
TODAY, Feb. 18, 2015, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/
02/18/obama-white-house-summit-on-countering-violent-extremism-speech/23631625/.
The process is just emerging and quite controversial. The question of the character of
political speech, is of course, at the heart of the problem. ““The terrorists do not speak
for a billion Muslims,” Obama said.” Obama Says US at War with Those ‘Perverting
Islam’, AL JAZEERA, Feb. 19, 2015 available http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/
obama-islam-extremism-conference-150218213833133.html. But do they speak for
themselves and their community? As Muslims? As criminals? As something else? Ought
that characterization to matter? These are the questions residing at the edges of the
problem explored in this article.
26. Cf. Backer, supra note 5, at 229– 54.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

2015

unknown

The Crisis of Secular Liberalism

Seq: 7

1-JUL-15

14:18

57

Specifically, the Article examines the ways that blasphemy27 and apostasy laws,28 affect the incorporation of religious values as a privileged political obligation. The Article develops this thesis by weaving together several
stories from developing and developed states where religion has acquired a
more privileged role. These stories illustrate the ways that blasphemy and
apostasy laws and the incorporation of religious values skew the nature
and application of the rule of law, the nature and limits of direct democracy, the relationship between apostasy and treason, the language of interpretation and the power to participate in that dialogue, and the role of the
foreign or minority. The effect is especially pronounced in states that value
neutrality and are formally organized on global secular liberal principles of
neutral and tolerant process.29 It suggests, taking into account secular liberalism’s solicitude for religion, that where the apparatus of institutional
religion seeks to enter into the political life of a state, its tenets ought not to
be accorded any particular deference.
The interactions of blasphemy, democracy, hierarchy, and religion are
the subjects of this Article. They serve as expressions of functional effects
of privilege, especially in states formally constituted under global constitutionalist principles. But this Article’s object is to consider their effects on
key constitutionally tinged principles that are foundational in the United
States— rule of law, direct democracy, treason, interpretation, foreigners,
and representation in multi-religious polities.30 At the center is the organized institutional expression of religion, rather than individual expressions
of religious belief autonomously applied to political participation. Related
is the privilege accorded not to individual belief but to religious belief institutionalized within organized religious communities. The purpose of this
27. Blasphemy laws were once common. Since the middle of the 20th century they
have been abandoned in most of the West although they still linger in some places, and
resonate in the structures of speech and religious liberties. See, e.g., Robert C. Post,
Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1988). Blasphemy laws are currently far more common and more
vigorously enforced in Muslim majority states. See, e.g., Osama Siddique & Zara Hayat,
Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan— Controversial Origins, Design
Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INTL L. 303 (2008). For a discussion of
blasphemy laws in contemporary Australia, see Bede Harris, Pell v. Council of Trustees of
the National Gallery of Victoria— Should Blasphemy Be a Crime— The Piss Christ Case and
Freedom of Expression, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217 (1998). Blasphemy laws can be understood as the cluster of regulation designed to ensure a privileged role for religion in
society.
28. Apostasy remains a religious crime but over the last century has effectively
ceased to be an object of civil regulation in most developed states. Like blasphemy,
apostasy retains an important role in the legal structures of some Muslim majority
states. See, e.g., S.A. RAHMAN, PUNISHMENT OF APOSTASY IN ISLAM (2006). Even in states
where apostasy is no longer a matter for state authorities, its political implications can
be acute. See, e.g., DAVID G. BROMLEY, THE POLITICS OF APOSTASY: THE ROLE OF APOSTATES
IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS (1998); Rudolph Peters and Gert J.J. de
Vries, Apostasy in Islam, 17(1/4) DIE WELT DES ISLAMS, New Series, 1– 25 (1976– 77).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See What is the Rule of Law?, ABA DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Partv1DialogueROL
.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Article is to frame the existential dilemma of secular liberalism within the
international normative house it has created by knitting together a series of
related vignettes, each of which is meant to serve as a starting point for
understanding the way that specific sorts of privilege tend to change the
political dynamics between religion and its rivals in a state’s political
spaces. These are meant to frame issues rather than suggest answers.
Part I considers the effect on rule of law when religion is privileged
through the protections of blasphemy laws. The context is Pakistan and
the highly controversial efforts to condemn a Christian peasant woman for
insulting Islam and its Prophet. Part II then considers the effects of privilege on democratic foundations of Pakistan. Again the context is blasphemy law and the assassination of a government minister who sought to
reduce blasphemy law’s privileging effects in Pakistan. Part III then considers similar privilege in the relationship between direct political action,
the state, and foreigners. Now the context moves to Sudan and its interrelations with foreigners. Part IV then considers the way that religious privileging may change the framework of inclusion and exclusion from a political
community by examining the effects of privileging on apostasy and treason. The context is Afghanistan and the efforts to condemn a man for
conversion to Christianity. This is particularly significant because the
Afghani constitution is in part a product of the Western intervention that
replaced the Taliban regime with something else. Part V moves to an examination of the effect of privilege on the ways in which constitutional and
legal texts are interpreted, and the constraints on those within the polity
now legitimately able to engage in such interpretive projects. The context
is Iran. Part VI brings the analysis back home to the West by considering
the ways in which these privileging mechanics may be finding their way
into the debates over the extent of religious privileging, and the use of that
privilege by religion when it engages in direct political activity. That, of
course, is the context in which one can better understand the crisis of secular liberalism and the contests over the relationship between religion and
the state— the discourse moves from the original one, the way in which the
state could protect religion from itself and from other religions,31 to one
that considers the extent to which religion may keep its privilege and protection against attack even as it inserts itself, as religion, in the political
contests central to the operation of Western democracy.
Though the main focus is on developments in Muslim majority states,
one should emphasize that this is not a situation unique to Islam. Indeed,
other large well organized and dominant religious institutions, institutional

31. It’s international expression was memorialized in Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) available at http:/
/daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388.pdf?
OpenElement (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance”).
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Christianity32 and Buddhism,33 for example, have also begun to move in
similar directions. The Article thus ends where it began, with the existential crisis of the West, recently made manifest in the U.S. by the demand of
economic for-profit corporations seeking to assert religious rights of shareholders to determine the shape of healthcare and other employee benefits
for a labor force that they employ.34 These point to the real crisis of secular liberalism in the early 21st century. There exists a desire to extend a
solicitude for expressions and practices of religious faith including those
exercised through the governance organs of institutional religion and their
law systems while simultaneously encouraging these religions, whether or
not exercised within institutionalized communities to participate in the
political life of a polity made up of many communities, not all religious,
while preserving the privileges of religion in the political sphere.35 At the
constitutional level, it portends the deepening of a new normative framework to succeed the framework of the 18th Century American Republic.36
Should international law also protect the political rights of religion through
these privileging devices, the effects might well be profound for transnational constitutionalism,37 and for the state.38 Privileging religion, as the
illustrations in this Article suggest, can substantially affect the way in
32. Larry Catá Backer, Law: Benedict XVI and the Constitution of Political States
Law at the End of the Day, June 30, 2007, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2007/06/law.html.
33. Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: Buddhist Constitutionalism in Sri
Lanka, Law at the End of the Day, (June 1, 2008), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2008/06/theocratic-constitutionalism-buddhist.html.
34. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Inc., Nos. 13– 354 & 13– 356 (Whether the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., allows
a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives to
which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation’s owners). See also Jaeah Lee, It’s Not Just Hobby Lobby: These 71
Companies Don’t Want to Cover Your Birth Control Either, MOTHER JONES, (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-sebelius-contraceptive-forprofit-lawsuits.
35. I have elsewhere suggested that “‘we are stuck on the horns of a dilemma of our
own creation. We conceived of the separation of Church and State, of the treatment of
formal Religion and its values as res at a time when religious consensus made these
religious sentiments an unconscious and almost inextricable part of the legal dialogue.
We have entered an age when this unconscious acceptance of underlying religious
Christian norms is contested. . . . the essay suggests that this is a dangerous enterprise.’”
Larry Catá Backer, Religion as Object and the Grammar of Law, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 229,
254 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Challenges of Constitutional Ordering in a Multilevel Legally Pluralistic and Ideologically Divided Globalized Polity, in THE LAW OF THE
FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 109 (Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Morly Frishman,
Laura Kistemaker, eds. 2011).
37. See Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism:
The Emergence of a Transnational legal-Plural Order, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 16– 52
(2012); W. Werner, The Never Ending Closure: Constitutional and International Law, in
TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas
Tsagourias, ed. 2007). The traditional relationship has been to protect religion against
the political process. See, e.g., Daniel Augenstein, Religious Pluralism and National Constitutional Traditions in Europe, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE (C.
Ungureanu & L. Zucca, eds. 2011).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

60

unknown

Seq: 10

1-JUL-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:18

Vol. 48

which a polity approaches and its constitution reflects the ideals of rule of
law, of direct democracy, of the legitimacy and forms of interpretation, of
treason and of membership in the polity itself. Where these political settlements are made in multi-religious states the difficulties of unequal citizenship might well follow.
I. Social Will Through Law, Rule of Law, and Religion— Blasphemy
Law in Pakistan39
Rule of law ideology masks the possibility of inversion inherent in the
law-state and law-norm framework on which the “rule of law” reality has
been built— social will through law. This inversion is better revealed when
religion is thrown in the mix, that is where rule of law is understood
through the prism of a constitutional system in which a specific and dominant religion is privileged.40 If law is used in the service of the dignity of
one religion against others, then the “rule” of law is that of the religion
whose dignity is the object of the domestic legal order.41 The form of a
secular rule of law system, then, masks its functional objective to protect
the privilege of a dominant religious group.42 Theocracy can, then, adapt
the structural forms of rule of law systems in its own service.43
It has long been supposed that law— understood as binding pronouncements from some apparatus of state legitimately vested with the
power to make and enforce such pronouncements— is successfully implemented only with the collusion of the population that is the object of its
command.44 Theories of non-violent revolution are grounded on this
insight.45 The study of the management of the legitimacy of law, and its
relationship to the management of the legitimacy of the state apparatus has
long been popular among political and legal theorists.46 That, in part,
might be a function of the popularity, in turn, of the instrumentalist view
of law, and the insistence on a connection, sometimes an exclusive connection, between law and the state apparatus.47
Yet the collusive element of law remains under-appreciated. Part of the
difficulty may lie in the connection between popular collusion and custom38. See, e.g., Katrin Langewiesche, African Catholic Missionary Networks between
Africa and Europe, in: The African Christian Presence in the West (Frieder Ludwig, ed.
2009) (on the authority of transnational religions missions).
39. Larry Catá Backer, Ruminations 35: Blaspheming Law, LAW AT THE END OF THE
DAY (Dec. 4, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/ruminations-xxxv-blas
pheming-law.html (an earlier version).
40. Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism, supra note 13, at 85– 172.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Carl Watner, Quod Omnes Tangit: Consent Theory in the Radical Libertarian Tradition in the Middle Ages, JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 67, 67– 85 (2005).
45. Civil Disobedience, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/.
46. Backer, supra note 39.
47. Developed more fully in Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law— Government, Law
and the Rule of Law in Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2008).
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ary norm structures. As laudable as the Enlightenment idea of progress
may be, and it remains a potently valuable insight for human organization
and development, those who embrace progress tend to be embarrassed by
their origins.48 Much like the well-educated and conventionally successful
children of working class parents in mid-twentieth century England, who
viewed their parents as a source of embarrassment and the embodiment of
what had been overcome,49 Enlightenment-grounded law theorists view
custom as primitive and unscientific.50 Customary systems of law are the
sort of state organization that progress impels society to grow out of.51
Organic and reflective, customary law systems cannot serve the instrumental and managerial purposes necessary to the appropriate functioning of
the scientifically structured law-state.52 It is not for nothing that even purported traditionalists like the American Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia could declare that Common Law has no place within the legal structures of the American Republic. 53
The collusive element of law is also problematic because it suggests
that law cannot live up to its own conceptual framing. The idea of the law
standing alone as a positive instrument of the state apparatus deployed for
the management of the masses, under whatever political theory that management is understood, is deeply embedded in the political construction of
law.54 Law is understood as self-referencing, as sufficient of itself to suggest its own meaning and the obligations imposed by its command.55 Law
expresses both authority and its operation.56 Law both constitutes the
state and serves as the legitimating form through which the state acts.57
Outside of law there is nothing but behaviors, habits, morals, and other
systems that may be potential objects of management through law, but are
not themselves law.58 As “not law,” these rule systems are not privileged,
unless they are superior to law, in which case law is ruled thereby and
must reflect its premises and substantive framework.59
48. See Backer, supra note 39.
49. Well explained in GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION (New York: Brentano,
1916). (See MSL Comment).
50. Backer, supra note 39.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Amy Gutmann, ed.,1997).
54. Iredell Jenkins, The Matrix of Positive Law, NAT. L. FORUM. Paper 58 (Jan. 1,
1961), http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/58. See also Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 533 (1992– 1993) Rule of Law in China : China With Legal Characteristics, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2014. Available http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/216293
83-xi-jinping-invoking-rule-law-thats-risky-him-and-good-china-china-legal.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For a discussion of the way in which this “not law” may serve in this role, see
MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE,
1975– 1976 80– 114 (David Macey, trans., Mauro Bertani, Arnold I. Davidson, François
Ewald & Alessandro Fontana, eds., reprint 2003).
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Yet that simplistic view, as complex and nuanced as its various theoretical expositions have become, over the course of the last two centuries,
masks the possibility of inversion inherent in the law-state and law-norm
framework on which the “rule of law” reality has been built. Even conceding that law can be understood in its positivist and instrumentalist form, it
is also possible to understand that, perhaps more often than not, the
reverse is also true: that social will represented through custom and usage
has a positivist and instrumental character that is merely memorialized by
“law.”60 Rule of law might as usefully be understood as social will through
law, providing the formal structure within which customary law can be
embedded and practiced within and beneath the law-state.61 Law serves
as a formal construction through which the customary framework of social
organization can be furthered.62 Law is a veil that provides an occasionally
thin cover over, and protection for, the implementation of social norms.63
The secular liberal framework, grounded in protection both of and
from religion in pluri-religious states and founded on rule of law principles, stands on a fragile foundation where social will is not committed to
neutrality and where one political stakeholder— a dominant institutionalized religious community— participates in political action on par with non
religious political parties. This fragility is especially apparent in a state
with a single large religious majority whose sensibilities are protected by
law. In a state with this dynamic, “[t]he law creates [the] legal infrastructure which is then used in various informal ways to intimidate, coerce, harass and persecute.”64 In Pakistan, the story of Asia Bibi and the law against
blasphemy is a useful illustration. The point of the story is lost on the
reporters and actors who have been playing important roles in the progress
of events.65 The specific context is blasphemy, but the insight is broader.
60. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production:
Courts, Law and the Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291 (2000).
61. Lary Catá Backer, Whose Crisis? Secular Liberalism, the Theocratic State and the
Political Consequences of Privileging Religion for Multi-Religious States, LSA Annual Meeting 2013, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (May 31, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot
.com/2013/05/presentation-at-2013-annual-meeting-law.html.
62. Id.
63. See generally Backer, supra note 60.
64. Karin Brulliard, Both sides in blasphemy case pressure Zardari, WASH. POST, Nov.
26, 2010 at A6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/11/25/AR2010112503585.html (quoting Ali Dayan Hasan, senior South Asia
researcher for Human Rights Watch).
65. See discussion, infra, text and notes 96– 108. As the story unfolds its focus is
entirely on the consequences of offending majority religion. The events that produced
that possibility appeared incapable of also producing insults against the minority religion. Within this context a hierarchy of privilege begins to emerge and one that is unconsciously taken up by those who cover the events, one in which one dismisses, as
irrelevant even the possibility of mutuality of protection. Note for example, Amnesty
International, Document— Pakistan: Pakistani Christian woman sentenced to death:
Aasia Bibi, 18 Nov. 2010, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/
011/2010/en/6907ef41-7350-414a-a45e-488df34654c0/asa330112010en.html (which
called for action to save Ms. Bibi but no mention of investigation as to the potentially
criminal conduct of the Muslim women involved in the argument, starting with the initial insult to the minority Christian woman at the well).
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Pakistan occupies the dynamic space between transnational theocratic
constitutionalism and the formal structures of secular liberal transnational
substantive constitutionalism.66 Pakistan appears to incorporate the best of
both worlds; yet it has also embraced some of their excesses. Pakistan
derives its political order from a divine source; to be exercised within limits
prescribed by God, as understood by Muslims and is organized to observe
“principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice.”67 Pakistan is structured to be a territorially defined political space
where “Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and
collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.” That political space also
calls for “adequate provision [to] be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures.”68 These principles provide the foundation for the legal structure of the Pakistani state
apparatus. Islam is the state religion.69 Simultaneously, “the protection of
law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of
every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time
being within Pakistan.”70 The protection of rights to profess, practice and
propagate religion is broad,71 yet it is “[s]ubject to law, public order and
morality.”72
The nature of that limitation is made clearer through the criminal law
of Pakistan, a legislative edifice that is formally neutral yet particularly
focused on the concerns of Sunni Islam. Pakistan’s criminal code, with
relevant portions enacted well before independence and the constitution of
the modern Pakistani state,73 provides a legal basis for the management of
this law-state structure. Chapter XV, Section 295 the Penal Code of Pakistan criminalizes injuring or defiling places of worship or sacred objects of
any religion with the intent of insulting religion.74 What is more interesting is that the crime extends to those who are imputed to have knowledge
that that any class of persons “is likely to consider” such destruction or
defilement an insult.75 Section 295-A is grounded in the sensibilities of
Islam; it criminalizes deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage
religious feeling by insulting religion or religious beliefs “either spoken or
66. See Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism, supra note 13, at 154.
67. PAKISTAN CONST. Preamble.
68. Id.
69. PAKISTAN CONST., art. 2.
70. Id. art. 4(1).
71. Id. art. 20(a)
72. Id. art. 20.
73. Act XLV of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE, ch. XV.
74. Id.
75. PAK. PENAL CODE, ch. XV, § 295 (“Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any
place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of
thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any
class of persons is likely to consider such destruction damage or defilement as an insult
to their religion. shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”).
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written, or by visible representations.”76 Sections 295-B and 295-C make
what is implicit in Section 295-A explicit. Section 295-B criminalizes any
defilement of the Qur’an,77 and 295-C criminalizes the defilement of
Mohamad.78 Section 296 extends these interdictions to religious assemblies79 and Section 297 further extends them to burial places.80 Lastly,
Section 298 extends criminal liability for a number of distinct acts of
speech: uttering words or making gestures that wound religious feelings;81
engaging in any speech acts that defiles the name of the wife or family
members of Mohamad, the so-called righteous Caliphs or Mohamad’s companions;82 misusing epithets titles of descriptions of certain holy personages;83 and in the case of Quadianai or Ahmadi Muslims, engaging in any
proselytizing activities by suggesting that these individuals are Muslim.84
76. Id. § 295-A (“Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
‘religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Pakistan, by words, either spoken or
written, or by visible representations insults the religion or the religious beliefs of that
class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both.”).
77. Id. § 295-B (“Whoever willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy
Qur’an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.”).
78. Id. § 295-C (“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished
with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”).
79. Id. § 296 (“Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully
engaged in the performance of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year,
or with fine, or with both.”).
80. Id. § 297 (“Whoever, with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person,
or of insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of any
person are likely to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted
thereby, commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any place of sculpture, or
any place set apart for the performance of funeral rites or as a, depository for the
remains of the dead, or offers any indignity to any human corpse or causes disturbance
to any persons assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.”).
81. Id. § 298 (“Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or
makes any gesture in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that
person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year or with fine, or with both.”).
82. Id. § 298-A (“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the
sacred name of any wife (Ummul Mumineen), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), or any of the righteous Caliphs (Khulafa-eRashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.”).
83. Id. § 298-B.
84. Id. § 298-C (“Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call
themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as
a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or
invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall
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Regardless of the merit of these provision, the structure of these
prohibitions provide a privileged context within which inter-religious conflict can be mediated— not through the Constitution, but through the criminal law. The criminal law serves traditional purposes of law as positive and
instrumental. Beyond its proscriptions, Pakistan appears to have an obligation to protect all parties.85 But the reality of “law” in Pakistan paints a
different picture. The Penal Code is merely the first layer of a multilayer
system of law: the Penal Code provides the context and language, but
neither its substance nor its limit. The collusive element of the blasphemy
law provides its extraordinary popular support86 and shapes the “rule” by
which the “law” is constructed and implemented.87
Thus the story of Asia Bibi: a story in which legal formalism hides the
customary norm framework that changes the structures of protection.
Shabaz Bhatti,88 a Roman Catholic and Pakistan’s Minister of Minorities
Affairs, argues that religion and the criminal law are the means for ordering
the organization and operation of small rural communities.
According to Bhatti, Bibi drew the ire of fellow farmhands after a June 2009
dispute where they refused to drink water she collected and she refused their
demands to convert to Islam.
Her fellow farmhands reported the incident to a cleric, who concluded that
Bibi had committed blasphemy who then gathered a crowd to force her to
the police station. The police did not investigate the claim and four months
later a court, without hearing Bibi’s full account, handed down a death
sentence.
Bhatti believes that Bibi, a mother of five who has been in prison 17 months,
never criticized Islam and is innocent. Bibi’s husband and children are now
in hiding. Bibi’s husband, Ashiq Masih, a brickmaker, told reporters that he
and his family “are frightened” and are “receiving threats, especially from
clerics.89

In the case of blasphemy, even the mediation of law does not suggest
the process of law. Rather, the law-state framework provides the structure
within which customary norms are applied. For example, people accused
of blasphemy in Pakistan are frequently so threatened that they must leave
their towns, and several convicted blasphemers have been killed in jail.90
Blasphemy laws are applied generously, and are acted upon rapidly. And,
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.”).
85. See generally PAK. PENAL CODE, supra note 75.
86. See What are Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws?, BBC, Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-south-asia-12621225.
87. See generally David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 27, 28 (1994) (arguing that the law against blasphemy has become a weapon
against religious minorities in Pakistan and as reinforcement of an Islamic construction
of the laws).
88. See Shahbaz Bhatti, a Catholic, is the new minister for the defense of minorities,
ASIA NEWS, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Shahbaz-Bhatti,-a-Catholic,is-the-new-minister-for-the-defense-of-minorities-13664.html.
89. Brulliard, supra note 64.
90. Id.
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indeed, the process of law moves rapidly from the sophisticated structures
of 20th century law-state sensibilities to other forms. Police officers are
supposed to investigate cases, but in practice, “accusers must do little more
than gather an intimidating group to lodge an allegation with police, who
then typically make an arrest to avert an uprising.”91 Moreover, procedural protections themselves are subject to the blasphemy laws. When a seventeen year old charged with blasphemy for statements made on a school
exam, police said they “[could not] report exactly what was written in the
exam paper as doing so would also amount to blasphemy.”92 Thus, process itself is subordinated to the normative sensibilities of the privileged
religion.
That privilege moves inter-religious relations, and the resolution of
their conflict, to expression in and through the language and structures of
law. One gets a better sense of this from another version of the story
reported in the Western press:
Asia Bibi was convicted of insulting Islam’s prophet, Mohammed,
while working in a field with several Muslim women in a village southwest of
Lahore.
She told them the Quran was “fake” and made comments about one
of Mohammed’s wives and about his health in his final days, the police complaint against her said.
She said that “the Quran is fake and your prophet remained in bed for
one month before his death because he had worms in his ears and mouth.
He married Khadija just for money and after looting her kicked her out of
the house,” local police official Muhammad Ilyas told CNN.

“The initial complaint against Bibi was filed on June 14, 2009, by a Muslim
cleric, Ilyas said.”93 The cleric, Qari Muhammad Salim, filed the police
report after Muslim women reported the incident to him.94 He claims Bibi
confessed to him and apologized.95 By 2015, Bibi remained in jail, though
there were rumors of her impending release. That appeared complicated
by the religious politics of Pakistan, and might require the family to flee
Pakistan.96
The story is interesting as much for what was not done as well as for
what was. The story focuses on the issue of Bibi’s criminal activity— centering against Islam by a non-believer. Completely ignored, of course, was the
91. Id.
92. Pakistan: Drop Blasphemy Charge Against 17-Year Old, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/02/pakistan-drop-blasphemy-char
ges-against-17-year-old.
93. Pakistan: Drop Blasphemy Charge Against 17-Year Old, Human Rights Watch, Feb.
2, 2011, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/02/pakistan-drop-blasphemycharges-against-17-year-old.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Madeleine Davies, Bibi: Release Expected But Ready to Flee, CHURCH TIMES, Feb.
20, 2015. available at http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2015/20-february/news/
world/bibi-release-expected-but-ready-to-flee (“He is convinced that, if his wife is
released, the family will have to flee the country: “It is not safe for her after her release to
stay in Pakistan, because they will kill her. I do not have any idea where we will go.” Id.).
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criminal offense of the Muslim women under Criminal Code Section 295A
and Section 298.97 Blasphemy is as much an instrument of majority will—
and the disciplining of minority behaviors in the face of the religious hegemon, as it is meant to be some sort of Western style means to setting
ground rules of keeping the peace among religious equals.98 As reported
by the Telegraph, “The court heard she had been working as a farmhand in
fields with other women, when she was asked to fetch drinking water.
Some of the other women– all Muslims– refused to drink the water as it had
been brought by a Christian and was therefore ‘unclean,’ according to Mrs.
Bibi’s evidence, sparking a row.”99 The “uncleanliness” insult has old roots
among ethnic majorities within the dar al Islam.100 For example, in the
Ottoman Empire, it was common for local communities to demand that
Jewish residents stay indoors when it rained for fear that their “uncleanliness” would wash onto Muslims.101 Likewise, the comments of the
farmwomen were meant deliberately to insult the religious sensibilities of
Ms. Bibi— an easy prejudice expressed in a disgusting manner.102 These
Muslim women also insulted “the religion or the religious beliefs” of Ms.
Bibi.103 Yet none of that mattered. The social norms of the community,
rather than the legal norms of the law-state, have found expression through
the apparatus of state.
Where, then, within this complex, can one find the law-state?104 It,
like the formal structures of law, is firmly anchored within national political and juridical institutions.105 But political power is not entirely embedded within the state constitution, and indeed appears to function more as a
gateway to normative law structures which are then applied through the
formal (but empty) structures of law.106 Pakistan appears as a bifurcated
state. At the local level, social norm systems take precedence, even if they
97. PAK. CRIM. CODE, Chapter XV, Sections 295A and 298.
98. See Doug Bandow, Doug Bandow: Pakistan’s Persecution, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (July 18, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/blasphemy-629241religious-pakistan.html.
99. Rob Crilly and Aoun Sahi, Christian Woman Sentenced to Death in Pakistan for
‘Blasphemy’, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 9, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8120142/Christian-woman-sentenced-to-death-in-Pakistanfor-blasphemy.html.
100. Larry Cata Backer, Ruminations 35: Blasphemy Law, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY
(Dec., 04, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/ruminations-xxxv-blas
pheming-law.html.
101. Id.
102. The comments were made, if proven, with deliberate intent to wound religious
feelings, and knowing that they would wound. See PAK. CRIM. CODE, Chapter XV, Sections 295 and 298.
103. A criminal offence under Section 295A. See id. at 295A.
104. This analysis draws on earlier theoretical work. See, Larry Catá Backer, On the
Tension between Public and Private Governance in the Emerging Transnational Legal Order:
State Ideology and Corporation in Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders (April 16, 2012),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2038103 .
105. PAKISTAN CONST. § 8.
106. “Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the
authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him
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are now forced to express their structures through the language of the law
codes.107 This is the realm of custom, of the precedence of religion, religious law, and institutions. It is the space where custom prevails, however
expressed.108 At the national level, law systems are well maintained— at
least as a formal matter.109 Functionally, the Pakistani law-state must exist
in a constant state of compromise with the social-norm state atop which it
sits. It is for that reason that Ms. Bibi may be pardoned but never vindicated.110 And it is even more likely that her fate will be tied to her willingness to accept exile rather than awaiting her neighbor’s acceptance.111 But
that is precisely the thrust of the social norms within which she fell. It is
likewise for that reason that the Muslim women who insulted Ms. Bibi’s
religion will never feel the sting of the Pakistani Criminal Code. Pakistan’s
law-state is quite distinct and subordinate to its norm-state.
Indeed, this is neither a new development in Pakistan, nor one whose
double purpose is unknown. The very minister who was then reviewing the
Asia Bibi affair rose to power in part on the basis of opposition to the
double use of blasphemy law. “Shahbaz Bhatti founded the Christianinspired APMA movement in 1985. One of his first battles was against the
law on blasphemy, introduced in 1986 and used to repress religious minorities in the country, with particular focus on the Christian community, the
one hardest hit by the new norm.”112 But as the incarnation of a portion
of the Pakistani law-state, Bhatti’s fidelity is to the formal structures of the
law-state.113 And that requires a mediation between the law-state and the
is a sacred trust” PAKISTAN CONST. Preamble, available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html
107. See text and notes supra, 96– 199.
108. Id. “Although no-one convicted under the law has been executed, more than 30
accused have been killed by lynch mobs.” Pakistan Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti
Shot Dead, BNBC NEWS ONLINE, March 2, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-south-asia-12617562.
109. See text and notes 68– 85, supra.
110. Asia Bibi’s Husband Urges Pakistan President to Grant Blasphemy Pardon: Ashiq
Masih Writes Open Letter After Appeal Is Rejected, CATHOLIC HERALD, Nov. 20, 2014,
available at http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2014/11/20/asia-bibis-husbandpleads-to-pakistan-president-for-blasphemy-pardon/. The Pakistani President has been
vested with a power to pardon “any sentence passed by any court, tribunal other other
authority.” PAKISTAN CONST. Art. 45.
111. Davies, supra note 96.
112. Shahbaz Bhatti, A Catholic, Is the New Minister for the Defense of Minorities, ASIA
NEWS, April 11, 2008, available at http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Shahbaz-Bhatti,-aCatholic,-is-the-new-minister-for-the-defense-of-minorities-13664.html.
113. Bhatti thus fought for a change in the blasphemy laws within the procedural and
normative structures of Pakistani law. His opponents deployed social norm counternarratives to characterize these efforts at legal reforms into religious insults themselves
impossible to maintain under the law. Karin Brulliard and Shaiq Hussain, Shahbaz
Bhatti, Pakistan’s Sole Christian Minister, Is Assassinated in Islamabad, THE WASHINGTON POST, March 2, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030101394.html (“The assassination came as a severe
blow to Pakistani liberals, who are increasingly being silenced by Muslim hard-liners
willing to use violence against those who do not share their views. Bhatti’s death
removed one of the few leaders still openly advocating the reform of laws that make
insulting Islam a capital crime. . . . Bhatti said [these laws] were used as tools to settle
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social-norm state of Pakistan, which in the case of Minister Bhatti had a
fatal outcome.114
The Federal Minister stated that Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
had given a clear vision for a democratic, moderate, and progressive Pakistan, where minority and majority would live in peaceful co-existence
under the one green and white national flag. “Minorities are sons of the
soil, Pakistan belongs to them and they belong to Pakistan[;] they have
made sacrifices and shed their blood for the creation and development of
Pakistan.”115 Shahbaz Bhatti further said that the white in the Pakistani
flag represents the minorities and to protect the life and property of the
minorities is the constitutional obligation of the Government.116 Yet, the
logic of privileging may necessarily lead to a different result.
Bhatti decried the application of norm-state values, especially to members of his own faith community,117 but he will serve as the instrument of
its application in his role as representative of the state. He indirectly
applied the substantive norms of the majority community expressed
through Pakistan’s formal law structures, even as he sought to use the ultimate power of the law-state to militate the effects of the application of the
social-norm State of Pakistan,118 as did Bibi’s lawyers.119 For even as the
law-state seeks to manage its population through its own system, the normstate will apply its own rules; rules consonant with the norm system to
which even the State has agreed to submit. The bifurcated Pakistani system
vendettas and persecute members of religious minorities. The Pakistani news media and
a broad spectrum of clerics have repeatedly turned that characterization around, equating its proponents with blasphemers.”)
114. “At its heart the Bhatti murder, like that of Taseer, is about the abdication of
government responsibility in the face of mob and political violence crudely justified as
defence of Islam.” Mustafa Qadri, Shahbaz Bhatti: A Victim of Mob Rule, THE GUARDIAN,
March 2, 2011, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/
mar/02/shahbaz-bahtti-pakistan-violence.
115. Federal Minister for Minorities condemns Announcement of Reward to Kill Asia
Bibi, Online Library, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Federal+Minister+for+
Minorities+condemns+Announcement+of+Reward+to. . .-a0243750607).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ““Within the Government, the Minister for Religious Minorities has been
approved, but his work will be rather difficult: “What can Minister Shahbaz Bhatti do to
change the controversial blasphemy law, if his Government has openly said that it does
not intend to lift a finger?” Haroon Barket Masih, president of the Masihi Foundation
told Fides. “Therefore, there is a stalemate.” “ASIA/PAKISTAN - Asia Bibi and the Antiblasphemy Campaign: the UN and Obama “Follow the Pope”, AGENZIA FIDES, March 14,
2011, available at http://www.fides.org/en/news/28332?idnews=28332&lan=eng. Yet,
even as Bhatti sought to reform the Pakistani blasphemy laws he took measures to protect the family of Asa Bibi in 2011 before his assassination. See Free Asa Bibi, available
at http://freeasiabibi.com/who-is-asia-bibi.
119. “Confidence in the outcome of the retrial, confidence in Pakistani justice, confidence in being able to demonstrate the complete innocence of Asia Bibi: these are the
premises and impressions with which Asia Bibi’s lawyers are preparing for the first hearing of the appeal process, at the High Court of Lahore, which has not yet set a date but
that “could be very soon,” the lawyers told Fides.” Asia Bibi’s Lawyers Confident,
COLUMBANS IRELAND, available at http://www.columbans.eu/index.php/news/pakistan/
215-asia-bibis-lawyers-confident.
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is much in evidence in the efforts in the state apparatus to control the
norm state. “Minister for Minorities, Mr Shahbaz Bhatti, has strongly condemned the announcement of reward for the killing of Asia Bibi by a Cleric
in Peshawar. The Minister said the announcement made is unethical,
immoral, unjust, and irresponsible, which should be condemned in the
strongest possible manner, as no one had the right to issue the degree of
killing against anyone[.] [H]e further stated that this is not a jungle and we
will not allow jungle rule.” 120 Which of the states, law-state or socialnorm state, of Pakistan will prevail remains to be seen. But with the assassination of Bhatti, it appears that the social-norm state may well be supplying normative content to the law-state in Pakistan.
Indeed, this point is still quite powerfully made through the dual centered law regime of blasphemy in Pakistan— the ideology of rule-of-lawstates belies the reality of its embedding within norm systems that exist
within the state, and in the form of religion and ethnic communities, across
national borders. To understand blasphemy within rule-of-law-state systems, one must understand the way in which multiple systems of lawnorms co-exist, sometimes unpleasantly within any territorially constituted
political unit.121 Yet it is important to understand that this phenomenon is
not merely a function of the operation of Islam through law-states in Asia,
or the problem of mediating religion and ethnic disputes through the state
system. Rather, blasphemy provides a window on a larger phenomenon:
law is neither the beginning nor the end of regulatory mechanisms within
governance systems. Even within states, governance operates through multiple systems that assert authority in a variety of ways.122 The ability to
identify and mediate between them, to harmonize their operation, to the
extent possible, will mark the frontiers of “rule of law” in this century.123
Pakistan reminds us that law and justice, not autonomous from religion,
can create a safe space for the hegemonic faith, but an altogether different
reality for those faiths neither tolerated nor suppressed. Law, formally secular, effectively religious, tends to move the center of constitutional legitimacy and the substantive norms it protects from one centered on the
individual, to one centered on the protection of the institution of religion
and its adherents.124 It is to that contradiction, one with substantial lessons for the religiously infused experimentation by overenthusiastic reli120. Federal Minister for Minorities condemns Announcement of Reward to Kill Asia
Bibi, Online Library, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Federal+Minister+for+
Minorities+condemns+Announcement+of+Reward+to. . .-a0243750607).
121. Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Governance Polycentrism Or Regulated Self-Regulation— Rule Systems for Human Rights Impacts of Economic Activity Where National, Private and International Regimes Collide, CONTEST, available at http://www.columbans.eu/
index.php/news/pakistan/215-asia-bibis-lawyers-confident. ED COLLISIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES INTO NORM FRAGMENTATION IN WORLD SOCIETY (Kerstin Blome, Hannah
Franzki, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Nora Markard and Stefan Oeter, eds., Cambridge
University Press, forthcoming 2015).
122. See Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism, supra note 13, at 151– 55.
123. See id.
124. See, Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism, supra note 13, at 85– 172.
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gionists in the United States, which this Article considers next.125
II. Popular Democracy and Religion— Pakistan126
Beyond the rule of law, the privileging and engagement of religion and
the scope of that privilege also shapes the nature of direct democracy and
democratic rights. Indeed, if the tensions between law-state and normstate are powerful in the context of fashioning rule of law regimes within
religion privileging states, those tensions are even more palpable where the
law-norm state confronts direct democracy. Democracy has been much in
the air lately.127 People living in developed states and their representative
have been talking about direct democracy, usually well managed affairs
through which segments of the masses may be mobilized by well organized
groups, to initiate a process of law making that is heavily regulated and
constrained by the states within which these efforts are directed, and subject to overall constitutional and normative constraints executed by the governments outside of the processes of which direct democracy is supposed
to operate.128 The people ought to speak authoritatively and government
officials ought to listen. That, of course is the essence of direct accountability that supplements the indirect accountability of elections, but one that
may not work as well where the governance architecture of a putative
democracy are fragile.129
But direct democracy might also manage the form and operation of
government itself. This was the essence of the “Arab Spring,” and it provided legitimacy for the West to overthrow the ruling governmental apparatus.130 At the start of the second decade of the 21st century, global society
embraced popular democracy and the power of the people, when properly
massed and successfully engaged, to affect the form and policy of the government under which they might consent to be ruled.131 Egypt and Tunisia show us the potentially transformative face of modern mass democratic
movements at its triumphant moment, or perhaps on the verge of it,
125. Larry Cata Backer, Democracy Part XXII: Vox Populi in Pakistan and Substantive
Values in Constitutionalism, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (January 31, 2011), http://
lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/democracy-part-xxii-vox-populi-in.html.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Cf. Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy: New Approaches
to Old Questions,” Annual Review of Political Science 7: 463– 82 (2004); Commission of
the European Communities, Green Paper on a European Citizens’ Initiative, COM(2009)
622 final (Nov. 11, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/enel_position_en.pdf.
129. See Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, Council on Foreign Relations, March 12, 2009 available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-fragile-foundations/p18749.
130. Elaine Ganley, Dictatorship to Democracy? Tunisia’s Risky Venture, MSNBC (Jan.
29, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/dictatorship-to-democracytunisias-risky venture/article1137418.ece.
131. See id.
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through a movement that might fade away.132 The effects of this movement
have reached beyond Muslim majority states, which has been problematic
for the imperialism it has encouraged.133 Yet, everyone applauds, and
American elites seek to advance their own agendas abroad and perhaps
bring the lessons of that engagement back home.134 Although most agree
that the essence of secular liberal state system is democracy and popular
engagement for accountability, there are some that dispute this claim.135
Mass democratic movements present another face through which it
exercises its sovereign authority when it is intertwined with religious privilege. Perhaps Pakistan shows us the face of popular democracy triumphant, the “day after.” The recent popular execution of former Punjab
governor Salman Taseer,136 a high government official opposed to the
severe application of the blasphemy laws in the Islamic Republic,137
reminds us that popular democracy, and the will of the people, raises fundamental issues of sovereign will and universal values to which no consen132. See id.; See Toby Cadman, Egypt Comes Full Circle: The End of The Arab Spring, AL
JAZEERA (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/egyptcomes-full-circle-end-ar-2014329161913398399.html (discussing history of Egypt from
the overthrow of the Mubarak dictatorship to the election of Mr. Mosri to his overthrow
by the military is telling).
133. Laura Smith-Spark, Nina Dos Santos, and Frederik Pleitgen, Ukraine Signs EU
Trade Pact as Russia Finalizes Crimea Annexation, CNN WORLD (Mar. 21, 2014), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/03/21/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/.
134. Monique el-Faizy, Obama Disengaged over Succession in Egypt, MASRESS, (Oct.
26, 2010), http://www.masress.com/en/bikyamasr/19330. (“With the issue of succession looming over the Egyptian political landscape and the Obama administration seemingly disengaged, a bipartisan group of American academics and former government
officials has been diligently working behind the scenes to focus the attention of decision
makers here in the U.S.”).
135. See, Color Revolutions Will Not Bring about Real Democracy (from GLOBAL TIMES),
CHINA DAILY FORUM (Jan. 30, 2011), http://blog.chinadaily.com.cn/thread-691165-1-1
.html. (“In general, democracy has a strong appeal because of the successful models in
the West. But whether the system is applicable in other countries is in question, as more
and more unsuccessful examples arise. In the West, democracy is not only a political
system, but a way of life. Yet some emerging democracies in Asia and Africa are taking
hit after hit from street-level clamor. Democracy is still far away for Tunisia and Egypt.
The success of a democracy takes concrete foundations in economy, education and
social issues. As a general concept, democracy has been accepted by most people. But
when it comes to political systems, the Western model is only one of a few options. It
takes time and effort to apply democracy to different countries, and to do so without the
turmoil of revolution.”).
136. Pamela Constable, Mumtaz Qadri Pleads Guilty to Pakistan Slaying of Salman
Taseer, WASHINGTON POST (Jan.10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011002576.html. (“Salman Taseer, the razortongued governor of Punjab province, was killed Tuesday in Islamabad. Thousands of
Pakistanis braved high security to attend his funeral Wednesday.”); Salman Taseer Murder: Mumtaz Qadri Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15135502. (“The assassination divided
Pakistan, with many hailing Qadri as a hero. Qadri was part of Mr Taseer’s protection
team but opened fire on the governor as he was about to get into his car in the capital,
Islamabad, on 4 January.”)
137. See id.
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sus appears likely.138
The repercussions have been severe and overtaken by the mass democratic mobilizations that have emerged around both the blasphemy law and
governmental suggestions that it might be softened for infractions against
Islam (no one speaks of the effects of blaspheming or insulting Christianity, Baha’i, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism or the like), and popular action
against government officials who support this change in the blasphemy
laws (or defend the Christian peasant women condemned to death for
insulting Islam).139 “The blasphemy laws have been in the spotlight since
the murder last week of Salmaan Taseer. . .who was shot by a member of
his security detail. The shooter, Mumtaz Qadri, later said he killed Taseer
because of the politician’s opposition to the laws. Taseer was a member of
the Pakistan People’s Party, which runs the governing coalition, and was
close to President Asif Ali Zardari.”140
The democratic aspects of the conversation about the blasphemy laws,
the condemnation of the Christian peasant under its terms and the execution of a political figure opposed to the law that led to that condemnation
is well-evidenced in Pakistan, following a pattern of popular demonstration
widely and positively regarded recently when effected against the governments of Egypt and Tunisia.141 The democratic process has been invoked
to ensure that while religion can participate in politics, it is insulated from
attack ostensibly on religious grounds. The same, was true, and to good
political effect, of Catholicism deployed against the Marxist-Leninist
regimes in Poland, especially in the 1980s,142 and has been used effectively
as an intermediary in Cuba.143
138. Mohammed Hanif, Pakistan Viewpoint: Who is to Blame for Taseer’s Death? BBC
NEWS ONLINE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12129770
(describing foundational structures that produced the murder).
139. See Bad Mouthing: Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws Legitimate Intolerance, The Economist Nov. 29, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21635070pakistans-blasphemy-laws-legitimise-intolerance-bad-mouthing.
140. Zahid Hussain, Islamists Rally for Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA, (Jan. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870448270
4576071701535155530.
141. See Elaine Ganley, Dictatorship to Democracy? Tunisia’s Risky Venture, MSNBC
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/dictatorship-to-democracy-tunisias-risky-venture/article1137418.ece; see Toby Cadman, Egypt Comes Full Circle: The End of the Arab Spring, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2014/03/egypt-comes-full-circle-end-ar-2014329161913398399.html;
Salman Taseer Murder: Mumtaz Qadri Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Oct. 1,
2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15135502. But Egypt
remains more problematic as it continues to embrace the norms of Islam but not political organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood, that appear to institutionalize religious
privilege within an apparatus autonomous of the state.
142. Mirella W. Eberts, The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland, 50
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 817– 42 (1998).
143. John L. Allen, Jr., A Victory for the Vatican’s Line of Détante, CRUX, Dec. 17, 2014,
available at http://www.cruxnow.com/church/2014/12/17/us-cuba-breakthrough-is-avictory-for-the-vaticans-line-of-detente/.; Pope Francis as Castro-Obama Intermediary,
WORLD AFFAIRS, Dec. 22, 2014, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/
roland-flamini/pope-francis-castro-obama-intermediary.
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Participation and privilege invert mass democracy from object to
method. This was much in evidence in the use of the techniques of direct
democracy to protect religion from the democratic engagement, which is
the tool of that effort. About 40,000 people rallied in Pakistan’s eastern city
of Lahore on Sunday in the latest protest against proposed reforms of a
controversial blasphemy law, police said.
Religious groups have held protests in several Pakistani cities since
former Punjab governor Salman Taseer vowed to amend the law, that was
recently used to sentence a Christian woman to death Taseer’s stance
enraged the country’s increasingly conservative religious base and he was
assassinated on January 4 by his own security guard, who has said he
killed the governor over his support for reform. Under intense pressure
from religious parties, Pakistan’s government has since said it had no
intentions to amend the law. Demonstrators from religious parties Jamaate-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan and Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a charity linked
with 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, held banners in support of Mumtaz
Qadri— the police commando who shot dead Taseer. Participants chanted
slogans including “Free Mumtaz Qadri,” “We are ready to sacrifice our lives
for the honour of Prophet Mohammad,” and “Changes in blasphemy law
not accepted.” An AFP reporter saw activists carrying effigies of Pope Benedict XVI and Pakistani Minority Affairs Minister Shahbaz Bhatti shouting
slogans “Allah-o-Akbar.”144
The popular mobilizations of sovereign will suggest at least two issues.
The first touches on the nature of constitutional democracy and the role of
the popular sovereign. Westerners, and especially Americans, tend to view
popular sovereignty in a peculiar way. It is that great spark that extinguishes one set of government and imposes on itself another. Thereafter,
and until it acts again, it is constrained by the government it has created,
and acts only indirectly— in the election of individuals who represent the
popular will.145 Sometimes both the popular sovereign and its representatives are constrained by substantive norms that are beyond their power to
overcome. For example, slavery could not be reinstated in the United
States, the central value of human dignity could not be overcome in Germany, and socialist values could not be rejected in China, without destroying the constitutional order itself.146
But an older constitutional tradition does not recognize constraints on

144. Thousands Rally in Pakistan over Blasphemy Law, SIFINEWYS.com (Jan. 30,
2011), http://www.sify.com/news/thousands-rally-in-pakistan-over-blasphemy-lawnews-international-lb4sucajhcb.html.
145. Cf. Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to
Old Questions, ANN. REV. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 7, 463– 82 (2004).
146. See, e.g., Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251 (1995– 1996); Richard
Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (2010– 2011); Yaniv Roznai, The
Theory And Practice Of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits On Constitutional Amendments. 62(3)
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557– 97 (July 2013).
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popular will other than those self-imposed.147 In that case, either the people, through plebiscite or through their legislature.148 In that case, democratic mass mobilization on the streets, or pressure on representatives
(acting as the proxy for the popular will) could impose a substantive
regime that reflects the current will of the masses.149 In that case, the
popular will could impose anything from the political disability of inhabitants because of religion (France under the Vichy regime), and their segregation and extermination (Nationalist Socialist Germany) as long as the
process was lawful and reflected the majority will.150
Pakistan suggests an older face of democratic constitutionalism, one
in which process merely directs the mechanics of the expression of mass
democratic will without constraint. This older approach remains, in vestigial form, in constitutions that may be easily amended by popular action.151
Describing the participation of an Islamic group, the Sunni Ittehad Council, in support of the assassin of Mr. Taseer:
Barelvis, who are dominant in Punjab, did not support the holy war against
Soviet rule in Afghanistan. As terrorist attacks have surged in Pakistan, several prominent Barelvis have issued decrees condemning suicide bombing
and other violence. Islamist insurgents have responded with major bombings at Sufi shrines and mosques.
Over the past two years, the sect has formed an alliance that, leaders say,
intends to field candidates for political office to promote peaceful Islam and
the authority of the state. The group, the Sunni Ittehad Council, is staunchly
anti-American, but also fervently anti-Taliban, on grounds that killing
innocents cannot be justified under Islam.
“This is a very basic concept. If you kill an innocent person, it means you are
killing all humanity,” said Mohammed Ziaul Haq, a council spokesman and
author whose new book is titled “WikiLeaks: America’s Horrendous Face.”
“Islam is a religion of peace and love, and it asks its followers to restrain
themselves.”
But killing in response to blasphemy is another matter, he said, making it
“totally different from terrorism.’’ The government had done nothing to
silence Taseer’s criticism of the blasphemy ban, he said, or his support for a
Christian woman sentenced to death for the law, which he said had made
Taseer an “indirect” blasphemer himself. “Ninety percent of people in Pakistan think Mumtaz Qadri is a hero.”152

There is an echo here of the sentiments supporting a greater role for direct
popular democratic action in the United States as well, though of course
from a vastly different substantive and structural perspective.
147. Larry Catá Backer, God(s) over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 11, 20 (2007).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Karin Brulliard, For Moderate Majority, A Hard Line, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan.
30, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/29/
AR2011012904095.html.
152. See id. at A-8 (“Ziaul Haq said.’If it’s a democracy, the government should think
about that.’”).
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Conventional wisdom now holds that Article V is the only way to amend the
Constitution. Article V is how the government amends the Constitution, not
how the people do it. If the people had to use Article V to amend the Constitution they would need permission from two-thirds of the Congress and
three-fourths of the state legislatures. This would mean that the creator of
our government, the people, would have to get permission from their elected
representatives. . .to amend the Constitution. This logic is ludicrous if power
remains in the people. The constituent power of the people– – the source of
all political power– – cannot be subject to the power of its creation. James
Madison had it right when he said that the people could just do it.153

This approach suggests an older form of constitutionalism, one in
which the popular will, manifested either through mass mobilization, the
monarch, ruling elite or legislature, is unconstrained in the scope of power
to impose political rules, as long as it is done through a legitimating process.154 Substantive values are supplied by the common traditions of the
people or from some other source.155
The second issue focuses on social will— preserving customary systems against even the limits and constraints of rule of law based substantive limits. It might be possible to suggest an alternative analytical
approach. The second issue that the Pakistani mobilization suggests is not
so much mass democratic instincts run riot, but the critical role of the
masses in guarding the most fundamental normative structures of the constitutional systems under which it has consented to be governed. “Speakers at the Karachi rally sought to justify Mr. Taseer’s assassination, saying
the killer fulfilled his obligation as a Muslim.”156 The people of Pakistan
have declared the fundamental Muslim character of the state and its
institutions.
That is not merely an incantation fetish but a shorthand for a set of
substantive values and approaches to law, governance and relationships
among people grounded in the normative rules of Islam.157 Jayshree
Bajoria notes: “Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed
at defining a Pakistani identity during the country’s formative years, wrote
Haqqani.”158 But that conflict does not suggest the arbitrariness of the
153. Mike Gravel, The National Initiative for Democracy, A Populist Concept of Democracy, http://www.mikegravel.us/national_initiative.
154. See, e.g., WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW
29– 31; 35– 39; 312– 15 (New York: Macmillan, 1924); HIROBUMI ITO, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 9 ((2d ed Tokyo: Chu-O Daigaku, 1906)
(reprinted Greenwood Press, 1978). For criticisms of variations of these forms of kaiserreichstaat see, Charles J. Friedrich, REBUILDING THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION, I, 43 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 461, 463– 64 (1949).
155. See, Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional
State: Democracy’s Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998); Nobushige Ukai,
The Individual and the Rule of Law Under the New Japanese Constitution, 51 NW. U.L.REV.
733, 735– 37 (1956).
156. Hussain, supra note 140.
157. See Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism, supra note 13.
158. Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-fragile-foundations/p18749#.
(referencing Husain Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future”, The Washington
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actions so much as the somewhat large abyss separating the normative values of constitutional societies within and outside of Pakistan (or at least
some of them). Looking at the popular mobilizations in this respect, one
can see them as a force for the protection of the organizing values on which
the state is founded against the efforts to undermine that normative framework by the importation of values and sensibilities that are alien to and
may threaten the normative structure of Islamic Pakistan, at least as the
masses mobilized understand that. We can still goad the butchers on from
the fences. For those of us who call ourselves liberal Muslims there is
always the option of turning away and holding our noses.”159 If Islam
defines the state’s normative parameters as well as its social, cultural, and
political values, then popular mobilizations defending it are legitimate and
necessary for the state to remain true to its normative constitutional
constraints.160
However, this also suggests a wide range between those values and the
normative constitutional values emerging from international organizations
and recognized, to some extent, by international law.161 Instead of arbitrariness, this range of values indicates a large gap between the normative
values of constitutional societies in and outside of Pakistan. Popular mobilizations then may protect the state’s organizing and foundational values.
This may also protect against efforts to undermine this normative framework by importing values that may threaten Islamic Pakistan’s normative
structure. This is at least how the mobilized masses understand the conflict. Furthermore, expressions of mass will are important in defining a
popular sovereign’s belief system.162 This is disheartening for Westerners
and those looking to expand the reach of value systems grounded in international consensus. The internationalist master’s tools are being used to
dismantle the master’s house and rebuild it in another image. Alternatively, it suggests a need for a limit on legitimizing popular and mass mobilizations. But managing and constraining popular democracy would
undermine or redirect the political movement’s trajectory, now over two
hundred years old.163
Quarterly 28(1): 85– 96 (2004– 05)) available http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistansfragile-foundations/p18749#p7.
159. Mohammed Hanif, Pakistan Viewpoint: Who is to Blame for Taseer’s Death?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12129770.
160. See generally DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
CANON (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2005).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal-pluralist Order, 1(1) GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 16– 52 (2012); Neil Walker, Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56(3)
POLITICAL STUDIES 519– 43 (2008); Poul F. Kjear, The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational Constitutionalism: A Sociological Perspective, in AFTER GLOBALIZATION— NEW PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION
285 – 321 (Christian Jorges & Tommi Ralli, eds., Oslo: Arena Report Series, 2011);
Gunther Teubner, Constitutionalising Polycontexturality, 20 Social and Legal Studies
209– 52 (2010); Backer, supra note 148, at 11– 65 (2008).
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A potentially greater and immediate issue is that a common language
about democracy, in fact, divides rather than unites the various systems
purporting to adhere to some or another version.164 For example, speakers
referring to “democracy”, “democratic values”, “vox populi”, and “substantive values” to manage masses165 do not understand or hear each other.166
People may use the same words and mean different things.167 Furthermore, the West’s fixation with using the right words168— terms to memorize and recite, but not analyze— advances appearances, but also fails to
meet its purpose.
As a result, some suggest that Westerners should understand displays
of popular will as signs of weakness in Pakistan’s democracy.169 Ironically, this analysis can also lead to the opposite conclusion. Popular mobilizations may serve as a sign of Pakistan’s strength as a direct democracy.
However, the values that democratic movement represents are not necessarily compatible with the West’s values. As Karin Bruillard reported:
The notion of a moderate but silent Pakistani majority has also been undermined by the stance taken by the nation’s young black-suited lawyers, who
three years ago led massive pro-democracy strikes but this month showered
rose petals on Mumtaz Qadri, the killer of Punjab governor Salman
Taseer.170

Bruillard also noted, “Civilian and military officials have responded with
little more than tepid disapproval to the killing.”171 This raises political,
moral, and religious issues. It also shows the peak of an existential crisis
for secular liberalism. The only way to tolerate these contradictions is with
164. See generally Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global
Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 101 (2008).
165. See Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XXVI: Democratic Accountability— From
Voter to Managed Mob, Law at the End of the Day, (June 3, 2012), available at http://
lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/democracy-part-xxvi-democratic.html.
166. See Larry Catá Backer, Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy for China in the
21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the
Emerging Chinese Constitutional State, 16(1) ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 29– 82 (2014). Cf.
Richard Bellamy, Republicanism, Democracy and Constitutionalism, in REPUBLICANISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 159– 189 (Cécile Laborde and John Maynor, 2008))
167. Id. (considering endogenous versus exogenous democracy theory). See also
Jiunn-Rong Yeh, The Emergence of Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 4
N.T.U L. Rev. 39 (2009) (considering evolving paradigms of constitutionalism).
168. See Backer, supra note 166, at 149.
169. See Ali Dayan Hasan, Op-Ed., An Assassination in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/opinion/07iht-edhasan07.html?_r=1&.
(“In this tense, hate-filled atmosphere, the political courage to stand up for Asia Bibi —
and Pakistan’s fragile democracy — is short supply. “).
170. Roses for Pakistan Governor’s Alleged Killer, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/video/2011/01/05/VI2011010504540
.html.
171. Karin Brulliard, For Moderate Majority, A Hard Line, WASH. POST, (Jan. 30, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/29/AR2011012904
095.html. However, there were significant expressions of popular support for the slain
minister. See Pakistani Governor Salman Taseer Assassinated, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/gallery/2011/01/04/GA201101040
3151.html.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

2015

unknown

Seq: 29

1-JUL-15

The Crisis of Secular Liberalism

14:18

79

a combination of wishful thinking and formalism without substance, but
embracing formalism produces contradictions. For example, Islam is a
major influence on a state committed to democratic expression. However,
the state also protects religious and political players through blasphemy
and other religious privileging laws. This, in turn, reinforces religious hierarchy at a local level.172
III. Popular Democracy, Religion, and Tolerating the Foreigner—
Sudan173
With secular liberal ideals, there are more complex issues when mass
democracy and popular expression focus on “the stranger” or the religious
and political minority. Governing elites point to “happy” citizens voting as
democracy’s essence.174 Another hallmark of democratic governance is
public expression or public assemblies to express popular will.175 The purpose of that expression is to pressure the State to align its actions with the
people’s will.176 Western countries recognize this as good.177 For example, during the Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, citizens acting en masse
caused an unresponsive government to take action.178 However, these
expressions also have martyrs. The West continues to applaud the 1980
crowd in Tiananmen Square that the State dispersed.179 It also recognizes
as democratic expression the Eastern European citizens who assembled in
defiance of the state conduct that went against their collective wishes. For
example, this occurred in Hungary in 1956 and in the former Czechoslova172. Cf. Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA(Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-fragile-foundations/
p18749#. (“The political use of Islam by the state “promotes an aggressive competition
for official patronage between and within the many variations of Sunni and Shia Islam,
with the clerical elites of major sects and subsects striving to build up their political
parties, raise jihadi militias, [and] expand [madrassa] networks,” said a 2005 International Crisis Group report.”).
173. Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part IV: Managing Popular Expressions and the
Democratic Impulse in Sudan, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 25, 2007, 3:03 PM),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/democracy-part-iv.html.
174. Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part II: Voting Among the Unruly Masses, LAW AT
THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 16, 2007, 10:01 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2007/11/democracy-part-ii.html. This is not just a trend with citizens of Anglo-European democratic, constitutional states. See Fidel Castro, Reflections by the Commander in
Chief (Oct. 19, 2007 6:12 PM), http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/2007/ing/
f191007i.html. (“Having more than 90 per cent of all citizens voting in the elections and
school children guarding the ballots is an unheard of experience; it’s hard to believe that
this occurs in one of the “dark corners of this world,” a harassed and blockaded country
named Cuba. That is how we exercise the vigorous muscles of our political awareness.”)
175. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and
Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 953– 54 (2014).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Adrian Karatnycky, Letter From Kiev: On Independence Square, 74 AM.
SCHOLAR 6, 6– 9 (2005).
179. See, e.g., Tiananmen Revisited, 1989– 2001, CNN.COM (June 4, 2001).
TIONS
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kia in 1968.180
But not all manifestations of public expression are large scale. Any
institution created to serve the masses according to their terms may face
protests. In fact, the institution’s members should be sensitive to the
expressed will of those that they serve. Collectively, the public asserts
their individual rights. These expressions may target either specific representatives or state bodies, whether or not they are representative. Thus,
individuals’ votes are an expression of their participation in a democratic
state, even though this power is essentially passive. Individuals also
express their collective will by taking to the streets.181 Furthermore, they
may join together to form political parties and other collectives, like civil
society. But one must reconcile the state’s law with the institutional order
and political power based on individuals who are collectively the state.
One can anticipate this problem in many democratic states; some
Western countries even produced documents to reason through this tension. For example, the United States’ Declaration of Independence encourages assembly, yet the Federal Constitution then limits the Declaration of
Independence’s revolutionary implications.182 Westerners measure the
effects of large-scale expressions of social will by their loyalty to the original values of mass popular expression.183 Yet the boundary between individuals who can form part of a popular sovereign and those cannot shifted
dramatically in liberal democracies. This occurred even though the state’s
foundational principles did not change. For example, consider the changing position of individuals of African descent in the United States, from the
Republic’s founding through the 2008 presidential election.
Thus, for example, South Africa defines political rights under its constitution precisely: people have the right to make political choices, to vote
in elections that are free and fair and stand for office.184 Assembly is managed within a rule of law normative framework: “Everyone has the right,
peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to
present petitions.”185
Still, since 1945 and the creation of the global informal governance
system of the “community of nations,” the West and global political elites
(including lawyers and judges) have sought to naturalize these tropes of
manifestations of popular will as central to the construction of legitimate
democratic constitutional orders (if only as a sort of managed expression
180. See GRZEGORZ EKIERT, THE STATE AGAINST SOCIETY: POLITICAL CRISES AND THEIR
AFTERMATH IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 37– 38, 121– 23 (Princeton University Press, 1996).
181. Karatnycky, supra note 178, at 6– 9.
182. See Larry Catá Backer, Some Thoughts on the American Declaration of Independence and its Irish/European Connections at Century’s End, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY
(July 4, 2006 10:00 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/07/some-thoughts-onamerican-declaration.html.
183. See Adam Alexi Solomon, Changing Colors: Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, 27
HARV. INT’L REV. 11, 11– 12 (2006).
184. S. AFR. CONST., art. 19, 1996.
185. Id., at art. 17.
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within “rule of law” constraints).186 Within less democratic regimes, such
less restrained expression might also serve as a manifestation of revolutionary will to move the nation to a system of ordered, well managed, democratic constitutional rule of law structures of governance.187 It is thus for
those reasons that the international community was so eager to stand
behind the lawyers and judges who protested against the arbitrary actions
of the President (and until November 2007, the General) Musharraf of
Pakistan (whose actions they appeared to tolerate better before their own
respective oxen were gored).188 And regional human rights instruments
also echo this popular notion.189 Many in Western developed states were
thus relieved to note that the exercise of this power of popular expression
had been spreading rapidly to other parts of the world,190 even when
unsuccessful,191 and especially in Muslim majority states.192
It was with these thoughts in mind that one might read stories of
events that have been occurring in Sudan. It seems that a kindly woman,
Gillian Gibbons, a citizen of the United Kingdom, took it into her head to
travel to Sudan to do good. There she sought to teach children at a Sudanese primary school named the Unity High School.193 It was in the course
of her instruction that the events that prompted this reverie on democratic
expression took place: “In September, Mrs. Gibbons allowed her class of
primary school pupils to name the teddy bear Muhammad as part of a
186. The foundation for this may be the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95– 20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available http://www
.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html. It has not been universally embraced, and certainly not
embraced in the same way by the community of states. See also Marcel Alexander Niggli
& Tornike Keshelava, Democratic Legitimacy and its Discontents, 1969 REVUE GENERALE
DE DROIT 127, 129 (2011).
187. See id.
188. See Lawyers Protest Against Musharraf, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2007), http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6441133.stm.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Louis Jacobson, Hilary Clinton Says in Iran in 1979 Extremists Hijacked
a Broad-Based, Popular Revolution Against the Shah, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 11, 2014)
available at http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/jun/11/hillaryclinton/hillary-clinton-says-iran-1979-extremists-hijacked/.
191. See, e.g., Donya Alinejad, The Death of the “Twitter Revolution” and the Struggle
Over Internet Narratives, ARSEHSEVOM, March 17, 2011, available at http://www.arsehsevom.net/2011/03/the-death-of-the-twitter-revolution-and-the-struggle-over-internetnarratives-3/; Ukrainians Overthrow Dictatorship, ORANGE REVOLUTION, 2004 available at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ukrainians-overthrow-dictatorship-orangerevolution-2004; Oleg Karpyak, Ukraine’s Two Different Revolutions, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Dec. 3, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25210230; Timelines, Reforms in Myanmar, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-16546688.
192. See, e.g., The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution, NPR (Dec. 11, 2011) available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution. The
Cornell University Library developed additional online resources. See Cornell Universities Library, Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide *
: Home, available at
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/arab_spring.
193. See UK Teacher Jailed Over Teddy Row, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2007), http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7119399.stm.
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study of animals and their habitats. The court heard that she was arrested
on Sunday after another member of staff at Unity High School complained
to the Ministry of Education.”194 She was ultimately convicted of the
generic catchall charge— insulting religion (that is Islam, since it does not
appear that the provision extends beyond that construction of the offense
in fact, if not in law).195 “It is seen as an insult to Islam to attempt to make
an image of Prophet Muhammad.”196 Here, one moves from the protection
of religious sensibility to the appropriation of the mechanisms of government to enforce privilege not only to those within the polity but to outsiders as well.
She was lucky, we are told. She might have been charged and convicted
of graver offenses— inciting hatred (of Islam) or showing contempt (of
Islam).197 Justice was swift in accordance with its own internal logic in that
place.198 It helped that she was able to show the proper humility and deference to her hosts and their interpretation/application of their religion as
translated into rules of law. “The BBC’s Adam Mynott, in Khartoum, said
Mrs. Gibbons apologised to the court for any offence she may have
caused.”199 Gratitude for the kindness of the court abounded. “The
school’s director, Robert Boulos, told the AP news agency: ‘It’s a very fair
verdict, she could have had six months and lashes and a fine, and she only
got 15 days and deportation.’ ”200
The English, of course, evidenced the appropriate concern. Their foreign ministry people wrung their hands effectively in public,201 and their
foreign office personnel did their duty in private.202 But more than that,
the British facilitated the intermediation of appropriately situated persons
on its behalf. And who better than a couple of peers (class privilege) who
are Muslim (religious privileging) to deal with their counterparts (the connection of extra-national community based on class and religion) to mediate difficulties in relations among the political communities?203 In this
fashion the English appear to have also tolerated the Sudanese President’s
own insult to religion, which is not a criminal or civil offense in the United
Kingdom. “Sources close to [the] Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
believe there will be more [chances] of securing [Mrs. Gibbons’] release
through a Muslim-led delegation than through the Foreign Office’s diplomacy efforts.”204
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Pupil Defends Sudan Row Teacher, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7116401.stm.
197. UK Teacher Jailed Over Teddy Row, supra note 193.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See UK Peers Visit Teddy Row Teacher, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2007), http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7122790.stm.
204. Id.
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Indeed, throughout, the proper deference was shown to the sensibilities of the native population, especially by the condemned. We are told that
“John Gibbons, 27, from Liverpool, told Associated Press his mother was
“holding up quite well” and did not want the situation to spark “resentment” towards [the] Muslims or the Sudanese people.”205 And it appears
the UK has little choice but to dance to the Sudanese tune. “Sudan’s leaders
are rather used to the sound of western outrage - and have come to realise
that, for them, it rarely amounts to much.”206 Western outrage is an impotent rage, it seems.
Regardless, both the fate of Mrs. Gibbons and the issue of the use and
misuse of efforts to privilege religion through the use of the state apparatus
serve merely as a foundation for the more important focus of this Article.
For whatever one might think of the unfolding events outside of Sudan, the
Sudanese apparently felt that justice might not have been done.207 Fearful
that the Sudanese President would overturn the judgment of the courts
and grant Mrs. Gibbons a pardon, people took to the streets to protest.208
They expressed their disapproval of Mrs. Gibbons and her insensitivity to
their religion.209 “As witnessed during Friday’s protest, there was a minority who were baying for her blood. Some chanted threats against the 54year-old primary school teacher from Liverpool. A group of men shouted:
“She must be killed by the sword.”210 Newspaper pictures of Mrs. Gibbons
were burned on a makeshift stage at the heart of Martyrs Square.”211
Those marching believe themselves at the forefront of the efforts to protect
the rule of law in Sudan.212 One would think that the West would cheer
these events, yet the mass protests, rather than uplift spirits, caused
trouble. We are reassured that the Sudanese masses protest on the basis of
the same sentiments that perhaps Ukrainians or Americans might protest
in the streets.213 Thus, we are told, “this kind of sentiment seems to be
coming from a small group of hotheads.”214
And so a series of ironies that are worth noting play out here. First, it
appears that Ms. Gibbons might serve a symbolic role. She is a vehicle
through which Sudanese society becomes more accustomed to individual
political expression, thus leading to the development of democratic engagement with the state. From a functional perspective, there is very little that
appears to separate this sort of mass mobilization for the rule of law with
205. See id.
206. See Jonah Fisher, Sudan Leaders Court Western Rage, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7122007.stm.
207. See Sudan Demo Over Jailed UK Teacher, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7121025.stm.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Amber Henshaw, Sudanese Views Differ in Teddy Row, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2,
2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7123517.stm.
211. See id.
212. See Sudan Demo Over Jailed UK Teacher, supra note 207.
213. See Anup Shah, Public Protests Around The World, GLOBAL ISSUES (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://www.globalissues.org/article/45/public-protests-around-the-world.
214. Henshaw, supra note 210.
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that in European states or the United States for the same purpose;215 the
difference, of course, lies in the normative objectives.216 The people of
Sudan are uncowed, and so have become an integral part of Sudan’s development as a theocratic rule of law state in which Muslims are privileged
and all others are tolerated to the extent they conform to majority norms.
For the American analog, there is Justice Scalia’s reminder, in Employment
Division v. Smith, of one version of the nature of American democracy.217
Second, this expression of political will is grounded on an expression
of a rule of law system. Of course, the system appears, in its elaboration
and application, substantially inconsistent with that of rule of law systems
based on normative frameworks other than Islam (at least the form of
Islam understood in Sudan, applied by its courts, and on that basis authoritative there as both religion and law). A higher law might suggest that this
expression of law in Sudan is not legitimate on a number of grounds.218
But that notion might be viewed as anti-democratic (imposing different
normative systems on the Sudanese).219
Third, as a political matter, the treatment (fair) of Ms. Gibbons, ought
not to be subject to the intermeddling of foreign powers, especially of one
whose history of direct intermeddling in Sudanese affairs is still somewhat
notorious.220 Thus, the spectacle of the UK’s interference in the rule of law
system in Sudan might appear to be the product of colonial reflex. Even
worse, however, it might appear to return us to those days when the civilized nations of the world acknowledged that, in the absence of the acceptance of the world ordering norms of Anglo-American-European ideals,
systems were neither authentic nor legitimate nor subject to deference as
sovereign.221 And so it is unsurprising that expressions of Sudanese political will, of democratic values and the defense of the rule of law in its judicial proceedings, should spill out to the streets.
Fourth, the Gibbons affair makes clear to anyone willing to look that
there is a managerialism inherent in the deployment of popular expression,
even in its transnational context. Just as constitutions tend to contain and
manage the internal expression of popular will,222 so too does transna215. See, DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, MOBILIZING FOR DEMOCRACY: COMPARING 1989 AND
2011 (Oxford University Press, 2014).
216. “Thousands of Sudanese, many armed with clubs and knives, rallied Friday in a
central square and demanded the execution of a British teacher convicted of insulting
Islam for allowing her students to name a teddy bear “Muhammad.”“ Associated Press,
Thousands in Sudan Call for British Teddy Bear Teacher’s Execution, Fox News, Nov. 30,
2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/11/30/thousands-in-sudancall-for-british-teddy-bear-teacher-execution/.
217. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876– 82 (1990).
218. See Tony Francis, Separating Law From Morality, MEDSCAPE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2013,
5:54 PM), http://boards.medscape.com/forums/?128@@.2a593975!comment=1.
219. V. Bradley Lewis, Higher Law and the Rule of Law: The Platonic Origin of an Ideal,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 631, 631 (2009).
220. See BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
571417/Sudan/24316/The-British-conquest.
221. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32– 114 (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
222. See Mila Verstee, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L. REV. 1133,1139 (2014).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

2015

unknown

The Crisis of Secular Liberalism

Seq: 35

1-JUL-15

14:18

85

tional “etiquette” tend to contain and manage the effectiveness of national
popular expression.223 People are managed. Democratic expression is
managed. The vote is managed. Everyone must behave. And thus, transnational “etiquette” creates a great source of discomfort as democracy plays
itself out between systems of management that play by incompatible rules
(internally). From this emerges transnational constitutionalism— a means
of imposing some level of compatibility in the norm systems of internal
governance.224 But what is also deepened is the language of normative discourse on a global scale; it is this language that permits a discourse
between the Sudan and the UK, rather than requiring discussion to occur
at the point of a gun.225 For this, democratic expression is tamed; its holders cede authority upward to small groups invested with authority to stand
in for the ultimate power holders, and global groups of political managers
develop systems for regularizing their intercourse.226 This is a curious rule
of law— the rule of law for a global nomenklatura,227 constructed in the
name of peace.
And so we reach the essence of democracy in Sudan. On the one hand,
the West ought to cheer the expression of the power of people, spilling out
into the street to express their solidarity with rule of law notions naturalized in their political community. Here is the sort of democratic expression
that the West has encouraged, especially where it might deepen the popular participation in politics and engagement in governance.228 On the
other hand, the rule of law system within which Ms. Gibbons found herself
enmeshed is not necessarily compatible with core notions of fair play, justice, fairness, and the like as developed.229 From her perspective, there is
no rule of law, and what is for the Sudanese a popular expression of democratic values, might appear to her to be mob rule, of the sort common in
the Roman Republic in the days of Clodius and contributing in its own way
to the managerialism of Roman Imperial rule.230

223. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections
on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 67– 80 (Greenberg, et al., eds., 1993).
224. See Larry Catá Backer, Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for
Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 677 (2009).
225. Id. at 679.
226. See Constitutions, supra note 223.
227. For a classic discussion of the Soviet nomenklatura as the pattern to which this
use references, see Michael Voslenski, NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS (Eric
Mosbacher trans., 1984).
228. See Constitutions, supra note 223.
229. Id.
230. See Larry Catá Backer, Race, “The Race,” and the Republic: Reconceiving Judicial
Authority After Bush v. Gore, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1060– 61 (2002).
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IV. Apostasy, Treason, Political Community and Religion in
Afghanistan231
If Sudan suggests the nature of the tensions with secular liberalism of
a privileging model applied against foreigners, the issue of the political
dimensions of apostasy suggests its internal dimensions. After its successful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Americans, as leaders of a coalition of nations, also played a pivotal role in the making of new
constitutions for Afghanistan and Iraq.232 The Afghani Constitution was
adopted in 2004 after the convening of a traditional Loya Yurga, presided
by the former Afghani King, and a plebiscite on its adoption.233 The Iraqi
Constitution was adopted October 15, 2005 after the conclusion of unsuccessful three way negotiations between the largest ethnic and religious
groups in the country – the Sunnis, the Shi’as, and the Kurds.234 The Sunnis had refused to accept the proposal as ultimately adopted.235 Regardless, the constitution was submitted to a vote of the nation on October 15,
2005 and lauded as a great democratic leap by the U.S. Defense department,236 though its legitimacy appeared highly contested.237
These constitutions were different, in important respects, from the
great constitutions the Americans helped craft a half a century earlier for
Germany and Japan.238 Like the German and Japanese constitutions, the
Iraqi and Afghani constitutions are notable for a firm adherence to the
ideal of constitutional legitimacy grounded in the rule of law as both process, (state rule through law), and substance (state organization framed by
fundamental substantive principles and values).239 Indeed, the Afghani
231. Larry Catá Backer, Constitution and Apostasy in Afghanistan, LAW AT THE END OF
DAY, (Mar. 28, 2006), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/03/constitution-andapostasy-in.html.
232. See Saad N. Jawad, The Iraqi Constitution: Structural flaws and Political Implications, MIDDLE EAST CTR., 1, 7 (Nov. 2013).
233. See J. Alexander Thier, The Making of A Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 557, 570– 71 (2007).
234. See Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An
Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 886, 897– 900 (2006).
235. Id. “Not only is the security situation tenuous in many Sunni areas, but also,
two influential Sunni groups— the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Association of Muslim
Scholars— are boycotting the elections.” Milestone elections begin in Iraq: Polls open in
country’s first free vote in a half-century, CNN, Jan. 30, 2005, available http://www.cnn
.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/29/iraq.main/index.html.
236. “This is a very positive day for the Iraqis and, as well, for world peace. Democracies are peaceful countries. The vote today in Iraq stands in stark contrast to the attitudes and philosophy and strategy of al Qaeda and its terrorist friends and killers. We
believe, and the Iraqis believe, the best way forward is through the democratic process.”
U.S. President George W. Bush’s Statement on Oct. 16, 2005, quoted at United States
Department of Defense, Freedom to Vote, Iraqi Constitutional Referendum 2005, available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2005/Iraq-Referendum/.
237. See Feldman & Martinez, supra note 234, at 886.
238. James Dobbins et al., AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ
21, 52– 53 (2003) (showing American involvement in the German and Japanese
Constitutions).
239. Backer, supra note 147, at 47.
THE
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constitution purports to incorporate the great principles of international
human rights, providing in Chapter 1, Article 7 that the “state shall abide
by the UN Charter, international treaties, international conventions that
Afghanistan has signed and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.”240 The Iraqi Constitution, on the other hand, merely committed
the state to the observation of its international treaty obligations.241
But unlike the German and Japanese constitutions of the mid-twentieth century, the new constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq embraced a set
of singular transcendent norms— those of Islam. The Iraqi Constitution
declares Islam to be both the “official religion of the State” and, more
importantly, perhaps, “a foundation and source of legislation.”242 But
then in a great twist of legerdemain it constrains that declaration in three
ways: first, laws that contradict the “established provisions” of Islam are
forbidden; second, laws that contradict the “principles of democracy” are
also forbidden; and third, simultaneously, laws that contradict the rights
and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution” are forbidden.243 The
Constitution guarantees protection of the Islamic identity of the majority,
and of the religious beliefs and practices of everyone else.244 Moreover, the
Constitution appears to require the state to preserve Iraq’s place as “part of
the Islamic world.”245 It follows, of course, that the Iraq Constitution also
requires that the members of the Supreme Court be “experts in Islamic
jurisprudence, and legal scholars.”246
The Afghan Constitution also provides that “[i]n Afghanistan, no law
can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of
Islam.”247 This Constitution incorporates an ancient universal system of
governance developed within a global community of believers, whose
moral and ethical norms, it is argued, should limit the power of states over
their subjects, whether or not these subjects are members of the community of believers, as the ultimate interpretive source of political authority.248 In applying the law, the courts, including the Supreme Court, are
obligated to apply the interpretations of a particular jurisprudential school
of Islamic Shari’a to decide questions of law.249 Article 131 of the Afghani
Constitution (Chapter 7, article 15) provides that “while processing the
cases, the courts apply the provisions of this Constitution and other laws.
When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding
240. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 7.
241. Article 8, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005.
242. Id. art. 2.
243. Id. art. 2 (First) (A) – (C). None of these key terms are defined, nor is an order
of precedence specified.
244. Id. art. 2 (Second).
245. Id. art. 3.
246. Id. art. 92.
247. Id. art. 3.
248. Backer, supra note 147, at 14.
249. See J. Alexander Thier, The Making of A Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 557, 577– 78 (2007) (explaining that the Afghani legal system is heavily
influenced by the sharia).
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ruling on an issue, the courts’ decisions shall be within the limits of this
Constitution in accord with the Hanafi jurisprudence [one of the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence] and in a way to serve justice in the
best possible manner.”250 In addition, Article 131 further provides that
“Courts shall apply Shia school of law in cases dealing with personal matters involving the followers of Shia Sect in accordance with the provisions
of law. In other cases if no clarification by this constitution and other laws
exist and both sides of the case are followers of the Shia Sect, courts will
resolve the matter according to laws of this Sect.”251
Within this framework, apostasy assumes its political character as
treason, precisely because religion is a trigger for political privilege, for
belonging to the political class with the power to direct and develop the
normative political values of the state. In essence, in much of the Muslim
world, religious conversion does not just define one’s personal beliefs but
also one’s legal category. “It’s like saying you used to be Canadian and now
you’re Mexican,” says Brown. “It’s taken to be socially breaking your bond
with your community and betraying one for another.” The growing role of
Islamic law— especially judiciaries’ strict interpretation of sharia— is a matter of contention in secular states like Malaysia or Indonesia.”252 And
indeed, in states such as Malaysia, which like Iraq and Afghanistan established Islam as the official religion of the state,253 religious affiliation is
used to determine status.254 The religious character of a state, then may
transform membership within a religious community into a marker of citizenship and a gateway defining the nature of the privilege of political participation. It follows that membership in a religious community might
have political as well as faith based effects, and that those effects might be
subject to control by the state and grounded in the religious framework of
the faith based community whose governance structures perform a legal
(and secular) function.255
Afghanistan provides some evidence of the emerging political character of religious apostasy that is now being considered. The context centers
on the actions of the secular authorities in Afghanistan who sought to punish a citizen for the religious crime of apostasy. In a March 28, 2006 article
published by the New York Times,256 Sultan Munadi and Christine Hauser
write that this saga began sadly but mundanely enough, when an Afghani
250. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. (2004), art. 131.
251. Id.
252. Lionel Beehner, Religious Conversion and Sharia, Backgrounder, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 8, 2007) at 3 (quoting in part Nathan Brown of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace) available at http://www.cfr.org/malaysia/religiousconversion-sharia-law/p13552#p3.
253. CONST. OF MALAYSIA art. 3(1).
254. CONST. OF MALAYSIA art. 160 (defining a Malay, in part, as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms to
Malay custom”).
255. That consequence is explored as a theoretical matter in earlier work. See Backer,
supra note 13.
256. Sultan Munadi & Christine Hauser, Afghan Convert to Christianity is Released,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 26, 2006, AT A3.
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man who had left the country and converted from Islam to Christianity
returned to Afghanistan seeking custody of his daughters, only to have the
family tell the authorities that he was an apostate. Though apostasy is not a
subject of the Afghani civil law, it is a crime punishable by death under
traditional Shari’a principles. Given the provisions of the Afghani constitution, it makes perfect sense for the state authorities to seek to enforce the
religious law that serves as the foundation of state authority. Ironically,
Afghanistan will not see this case through to execution. It seems that, bowing to pressure from Christian majority states, the Afghani courts would
not see the case through to completion. Suggesting both procedural defects
and the sense that only mental illness could explain apostasy (in the form
of conversion from Islam to Christianity), the courts returned the case to
prosecutors. This postpones but does not answer the question posed. It
does, however, serve as a warning that theocratic democratic states will act
in ways inconsistent with the norms of secular constitutional states in the
West. While it may be possible to harmonize the results under different
systems of constitution making, it is likely that the methodologies of constitutional interpretation and the basis on which similar results might be
reached will be based on very different approaches to law. That stands to
reason, of course, where harmonization is sought between systems whose
foundational norm structures may be incompatible. In the case of an
Islamic Republic, apostasy from Islam might be deemed the equivalent of a
rejection of the fundamental ordering of the state, and, as such, as a political and not a religious act. The approach might have more in common with
understandings of class within Marxist systems than with the human
rights foundationalism of secular international institutional law.257
That this result is both understood by and a deliberate product of
American constitutional ingenuity, or at least of its sponsorship, should
also come as no surprise. People who listened closely to President Bush’s
second inaugural address would have heard an American willingness to
permit experiments in democracy. As I have written elsewhere:258 drawing
from universal principles from the founding of the Republic, as well as the
eternal “truths of Sinai, the Sermon on the Mount, the words of the Koran,
and the varied faiths of our people,” the rules of behavior between, among,
and within nations will be grounded in human freedom and democracy.
Democracy and human dignity provide a framework that limits the power
of any political community— nation, state, international organization, or
the like— to organize its society. Within that set of principles, it would follow that every nation has the right to choose its own path to freedom and
democracy, and every other state has the authority to help its neighbors
257. Mao Zedong, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, Selected Works of Mao
Zedong, June 1949, available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selec
ted-works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm.
258. Larry Catá Backer, President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address: A Revolutionary
Manifesto For International Law in Chaotic Times, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, April 1,
2006, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/04/president-bushs-secondinaugural.html.
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achieve and maintain compliance with these standards. But no community
outside of the nation should have the power to choose or govern the
choices made by any nation within the broad framework of liberty and
democracy. Again, as President Bush once suggested: “[f]reedom, by its
nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the
rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation
finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions
very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of
government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their
own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.” Although
this must be read with a certain irony, the insight is useful. But the irony
also functions as a mechanism through which the United States might
expend great energy to establish and protect a set of normative premises
for the organization of states around religion, and for the exercise of
democracy within those constraints, that might be incompatible with the
core political premises under which the United States itself is organized.
Perhaps Afghanistan provides a laboratory for a faith-based constitutionalism with implications for the future of constitutional interpretation in
this country. Perhaps the United States was unprepared to advise a nation,
heir to a complex and rich religion-based jurisprudence, on a means of
blending those traditions with the modern traditions of international
human rights norms that limit constitutional authority. Perhaps the socialnorm state must inevitably prevail over a law-state set of system rules, as
the two may be incompatible. There may be a strong relationship between
the context in which Asa Bibi became entangled within the webs of the lawstate/norm-state that were also encountered by Abdul Rahman. Whatever
the context, it will only be a matter of time before another Abdul Rahman
commits apostasy, or another person commits an offense against Islam
where the punishment offends international notions of human rights.259
More likely, however, may be the institutionalization of faith-based constitutionalism within constitutional structures of religious mechanisms for
determining not merely apostasy, but also membership in religious communities. Thus, the answer to the issue of Abdul Rahman may not lie in
the constraints of apostasy, but rather in the legalism of religious courts
with authority to determine the religious status of individuals. This
appears to be the way the Muslim majority Malay Federation appears to be
fashioning its constitutional order. In a recent decision, Malay courts determined that the right of a Malay citizen to have her identity card changed to
reflect a conversion was to be determined under the rules of the Islamic
tribunals whose faith she had purportedly renounced.260
259. For an interesting analysis in the context of Iraq, see Timothy G. Burroughts,
Note: Turning Away From Islam in Iraq: A Conjecture as to How the New Iraq will Treat
Muslim Apostates, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 517 (2008).
260. Lina Joy’s conversion to Christianity not accepted by Malaysian court, Catholic
News July 2007, available at http://catholicnews.sg/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=2232:lina-joys-conversion-to-christianity-not-accepted-by-malaysiancourt&catid=100&Itemid=473 (“On May 30 the Federal Court, which is the highest
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“You can’t at whim and fancy convert from one religion to another,” Federal
Court Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim said in delivering
judgment in the case, which has stirred religious tensions in the mainly
Muslim nation.
He said the civil court had no jurisdiction in the case and that it should be
dealt with by the country’s Islamic courts.
“The issue of apostasy is related to Islamic law, so it’s under the sharia
court. The civil court cannot intervene.”261

And thus, though the criminalization of apostasy may only provide the
more extreme example of the issue, the Lina Joy case suggests that the fundamental nature of the importance of apostasy is as a civil matter, where
states organize their political life around a privileged religion. In those
contexts, it remains fundamental that religious affiliation and citizenship
are closely tied.
V. The Interpretive Community in Theocratic States— Iran and Its
Priestly Caste262
Privileged participation has a further consequence, one hinted at in
the apostasy case in Afghanistan; it tends to structure and constrain the
way in which legal interpretation may be undertaken and further constrain
those legitimately vested with a legitimate voice to engage in those efforts.
The English word pretext is said to derive from the Latin word praetextum—
to disguise. But pretextum is the neutered past participle of an action
word— praetexere— a word suggesting a weaving as an act of disguise. Pretext thus embraces a notion of altering reality, of weaving a framework of
reality for a particular purpose. That objective serves both as cloak that
covers another reality and as its substitute. Pretext is history in action. It is
the ultimate effort of humans to become the managers of their own history.
And it is invariably a sloppy and badly managed affair. It is thus the ultimate hubris (?âñéò)— both pathetic and inevitable among a certain group
of people hurtling toward their own destiny. But that is a lesson that
human social, political, ethnic, and religious communities tend to believe is
the fate of others and not themselves. Each, in turn, weaves their own
destiny (usually on the backs of their opponents), secure in the knowledge
that they (unlike their predecessors) will “get it right.”
But hubris also suggests an intimate connection between the managed
disguise inherent in “pretext” and impiety. Where religious communities
engage in pretext, it, and especially its leaders, engage in an arrogance that
is also sin. There is a certain arrogance against the Divine order when takcivil court in Malaysia, decided that only the Islamic Court may remove the word “Islam”
from her identity card.”).
261. Jalil Hamid & Syed Azman, Malaysia’s Lina Joy Loses Islam Conversion Case,
REUTERS, May 30, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/30/usmalaysia-religion-ruling-idUSSP20856820070530.
262. Originally Pretext and Piety in Iran, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, Dec. 11, 2009,
available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/pretext-and-impiety-in-iran
.html.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-1\CIN102.txt

92

unknown

Seq: 42

1-JUL-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:18

Vol. 48

ing pretext in this context. It serves as a manifestation of the idea that
humans can substitute themselves for the Divine in the ordering of the
affairs of the world. Pretext serves as a challenge to God; as understood in
these communities, it is the acting out of a challenge to the Divine representation in those sects that screams: “I know better than God what is or shall
be.”
It is thus especially poignant when the leaders of religious communities manipulate the pious, in the name of their Divinity, through pretext to
sin, to become an insult to the community of believers and to the prophets
whose words and lives they purport to uphold. The Iranian religious community had developed an interesting variation on constitutional government grounded in the religious principles of Shi’a Islam.263 The Iranians
are not unique. The Malays have also sought to weave impiety with corruption as the basic language of political discourse.264
Still, having spent three decades perfecting an alternative to the communal constitutionalism of the world community, it is now in danger of
losing power to factions of the religious and pious who owe the progeny of
the founders no personal loyalty. That is the essence of democracy, even
theocratic democracy. But it appears that this consequence of the constitutional state that the religious elite created is now unacceptable to a portion
of that very elite when deployed against its own grip on power. The consequence was an election of highly contested legitimacy, at least within Iran,
which seemed to result in one faction keeping power.265 This produced a
crisis that pitted factions within the ruling clerical community and their
adherents outside of that community against each other.266 This crisis
forced factions within the ruling clerical community and their adherents
outside of that community against each other.267 The religious elite thus
constructed a constitutional state that incorporated the religious values
that they purported to maintain.268 The elite then faced the question of
how they could retain power without appearing to overturn the constitutional order on which the legitimacy of their political authority (and thus
also to some extent their religious authority) rested.
Pretext and impiety provide the answer. The story, as relayed by the
BBC, suggests that dirty politics have a religious context in Iranian elections, and in a manner reshaped by the religious framework within which
political tactics now fall:
Iran’s Supreme Leader has accused the opposition of breaking the law by
insulting the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
263. See, Backer, supra note 13.
264. See Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States,
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J. LAW AND FEMINISM 1 (2005).
265. Paul Reynolds, Iran: Where Did All the Votes Come From?, BBC NEWS ONLINE, June
23, 2009.
266. Iran Opposition Protestors Clash with Security Forces, BBC (Dec. 7, 2009, 21:59
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8398615.stm.
267. Id.
268. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN], ch. 1, art. 12, 13, 14, 1358 [1980].
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urged opposition leaders to identify “those behind
the insult to Imam Khomeini.” The remarks center on an alleged incident
during which a poster of Imam Khomeini was torn up. Opposition leaders
say the alleged incident - shown on state television - has been doctored. The
opposition has been refusing to endorse the result of the presidential election in June which returned President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power for
a second term. They allege the poll was widely rigged. The election dispute
is now radicalising both sides,” says the BBC’s Tehran correspondent, Jon
Leyne.269

The religious elite is set to use accusations of impiety against their
political opponents.270 Legal and constitutional discourse is now possible
only through the veil of religious discourse. The Pakistani blasphemy
model is inverted;271 the priest has become the judge. Within Iran these
religious judges, now presiding over legal discourse, would use a televised
image of a ripped poster with the image of a man as the pretext for substantial misapplication of the constitutional structure that they purported to
create. They appear driven to rip the Constitutional fabric of the Islamic
Republic in the same way they ripped apart the image of the late Ayatollah.
They intend to preserve their earthly power even as they weaken the theological underpinnings of the Republic created a generation ago. The Ayatollah Khamenei appears set to substitute the rule of individuals for the divine
mandate that the country purportedly charges him with protecting. “In his
remarks, broadcast on state TV on Sunday, Iran’s Supreme Leader said:
‘[s]ome people created riots and encouraged people to stand against the
system . . . paving the way for our hopeless enemies to undermine the
Islamic revolution.’ He urged opposition leaders to return to ‘the right
path.’ His warning on the alleged insult to the republic’s founder was
echoed by a statement issued by the Revolutionary Guards.”272 He will
tear the constitutional state in pieces to mirror the torn image of the late
Ayatollah. There is irony as well as impiety in this warning, and this
269. Iran Opposition Accused of Insulting Founder Khomeini, BBC (Dec. 13, 2009,
17:35 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8410558.stm.
270. And not just in Iran. Consider the situation in Indonesia, which also adopted a
blasphemy law overseen by an Islamist Board, Bakor Pakem, that sits in the Attorney
General’s office during investigations of religious offenses. “In February 2006, 40 Sunni
clerics and four police officers signed a public statement, declaring that Shia Islam was
heretical. The statement mentioned two meetings with Shia clerics, in which the Shia
were told to return to “real Islam” but refused to do so. The statement also asked law
enforcement agencies to enforce the blasphemy law against Tajul Muluk.” Indonesia:
Shia Cleric Convicted of Blasphemy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 12, 2012), http://www
.hrw.org/news/2012/07/12/indonesia-shia-cleric-convicted-blasphemy. Tajul Muluk, a
Shia cleric, was then sentenced to two years in prison for blasphemy and the “Ministry
of Religious Affairs in Sampang also declared they will ‘supervise’ hundreds of Shia to
learn Sunni Islam.” Id. Atheists are not spared. “In Dharmasraya, West Sumatra, Bakor
Pakem led the prosecution of Alexander An, an administrator of the ‘Minang Atheist’
Facebook group. He was eventually acquitted of blasphemy but in June 2012 the
Sijunjung court sentenced him to two-and-a-half years in prison and a fine of IDR100
million (around US$11,000), for inciting public unrest via his Facebook account.” Id.
271. See discussion supra Part I.
272. Iran Opposition Accused of Insulting Founder Khomeini, BBC (Dec. 13, 2009,
17:35 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8410558.stm.
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dynamic was captured well by Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, an opponent of
the ruling religious clique, when he suggested that, “[t]he current decisions, which are being taken by the minority faction that is in power, are
mainly against the interests of the country, and are not in keeping with
Islamic principles and values.”273 But more importantly, the Supreme
Leader’s statement suggests that a legitimately constitutional theocratic
state may not be possible, even on its own terms.
The torn image of the face of the late Ayatollah Khomeini suggests
pretext, hubris, impiety, and blasphemy. But whose pretext, hubris, impiety, and blasphemy is at issue here? As the Iranian state turns its governmental apparatus against its own, it continues down a path that risks
deepening the crisis of legitimacy in a thirty year-old experiment in theocratic constitutional ordering.274 And so the Iranian clerical class practices pretext, weaving together action and symbol, processed through law,
to disguise a less worthy set of objectives behind a facade of lawfulness.
With this praetextum, certain elements of the Iranian ruling caste have
taken their destinies in their own hands. As the Greeks remind us, the
hubris implicit in political pretext can only end badly.275 Those who seek
to control destiny through this weaving will find themselves woven into a
greater design whose parameters are both beyond their control and in
which their fates are in part determined by their pretexts. This problem of
pretext is situated within a larger one— the conflation of sexual and religious corruption as a mechanism for engaging in political contests.276 The
battles within the Muslim Malay political elite— especially the battle
between the then current prime minister and his then putative successor,
Anwar Ibrahim, who accused the government of Mahatir of corruption—
played out within the pretext of sexual misconduct grounded in notions of
religious corruption.
In Malaysia, we come closest to the old connection between the form
of religious confession within Islam and that of social confession within
the judicial field. The Anwar trail was notorious for the fervor with which
the government sought to extract confession and impose penance. Law, in
the form of the courtroom, served as the site of a great morality play in
which corruption was exposed in all of its manifestations, in which the tie
between moral and political corruption was highlighted, and in which the
value of appropriate conduct was emphasized, while the fate of the transgressor was magnified. Anwar provided the perfect victim for this ritual.
Anwar was exposed precisely because he reflected critical contradictions –
273. Edward Stourton, Ahmadinejad’s Theological Foes, BBC (Oct. 19, 2009, 12:59
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8314126.stm
274. See, e.g., Abdul Qader Fayez Report: The Iranian Presidential Elections: Internal
Challenges, Critical Issues, AL-JAZEERA CTR. FOR STUDIES, (March 24, 2013), available at
http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/3/24/20133241
03038205734Iranian%20Presidential%20Elections.pdf.
275. See, e.g., Euripedes, Electra (written 420-410 B.C.E.) (E.P. Coleridge, trans., Classics, MIT) available at http://classics.mit.edu/Euripides/electra_eur.html (relying on the
sanctity of motherhood to trample it).
276. See Backer, supra note 264.
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a moralist in a government he accused of immorality, a man committed to
Islam condemning intolerance in religious matters. The trial was theater of
a sort— as effective a means of communicating norms as the posting of
judicial stories on the Internet.277
Within these contexts, what becomes clear is the way that, within polities in which religion is privileged, there appears to be a tendency to substitute the language of religion for that of politics, and to substitute the priest
(cleric) for the politician. Effectively, Iran, and to some extent Malaysia,
suggests the ways in which shifts in discursive forms shift political power.
Within a democratic polity, especially one with minority religious populations, the effects can be profound. If political legitimacy is grounded in
religious legitimacy, and its discursive forms, political and religious impiety merge, legitimacy will depend on the adoption of the forms of majority
religious behaviors and its discursive forms, and on reliance on majority
religious leaders. The result is a very distinct form of representative
democracy, one unsuitable for religiously plural states.
VI. Echoes of Religious Privilege in Pluralist States: The
Contradictions of Privilege and Participation278
We return to the West, where the forms and mechanics of religious
political engagement evidence the tendencies described in the prior sections, but which are expressed within the forms and traditions of secular
liberalism. The core of the existential crisis for secular liberalism reduces
itself to one of privilege and participation. Two recent events, while appearing to be completely unrelated, suggest that law, culture, politics, and religion have begun to interact in ways that are producing significant changes in
the socio-cultural foundations of Europe and the United States. Each
involves cultural objects. Both cultural objects are highly regarded by the
social elites in the states in which they appear. In both cases, the objects
are important representations of the production of high culture in the
West. In neither case was this disputed. Each event, however, involves the
intersection of religious sensibilities with these important cultural objects.
In both cases, highly important (and in one case almost venerated) cultural
objects were abandoned or rejected in favor of another set of values.
The first event occurred in Germany. On September 25, 2006, the
Deutsche Oper, one of the most respected opera houses in the Western
world, announced that it was eliminating performances of the opera
Idomeneo for the season and would replace it with two other operas “over
277. Id., at 154.
278. Larry Catá Backer, Offending Religion, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Sept. 30,
2006, 10:47 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/09/offending-religion.html;
Larry Catá Backer, Robert C. Blitt on Tunisia: Springtime for Defamation of Religion, LAW
AT THE END OF THE DAY (Aug. 17, 2012, 11:16 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2012/08/robert-crobert-blitt-on-tunisia.html.
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concerns [Idomeneo] could enrage Muslims and pose a security risk.”279
This is no ordinary work of popular culture. The opera, written by Mozart
in the 1780s, is considered one of the finest examples of its kind ever to
have been written. It has been performed all over the world.280 It is one of
the foundational works of Western culture music.281 But what is culture
today when the stakes of cultural production have changed? The reason the
opera was cancelled was simple: “[t]he decision was taken after Berlin
security officials warned that putting on the opera as planned would present an ‘incalculable security risk’ for the establishment.”282 It seems that
“[i]n the production, directed by Hans Neuenfels, King Idomeneo is shown
staggering on stage next to the severed heads of Buddha, Jesus, Poseidon
and the Prophet Mohammad, which sit on chairs.”283 The basis of the
determination of the existence of a threat “was prompted by an anonymous
phone call in June,”284 although the police had “no evidence of a specific
threat.”285 While a number of prominent politicians condemned the decision, Mozart’s Idomeneo did not grace the stage of the opera house in Berlin that year.286 “ ‘Has it come so far that we must limit artistic expression?”
[deputy Parliamentary Speaker Wolgang Thierse asked]. ‘What will be
next?’ ”287
Surprisingly, the answer comes from Dallas, Texas. There, a “popular
art teacher with 28 years in the classroom [was] out of a job after leading
her fifth grade classes last April [2006] through the Dallas Museum of
Art.”288 The Dallas Museum of Art does not have a reputation for exhibiting works of low culture.289 Indeed, it prides itself as one of the premiere
showcases of the best artistic work of Western civilization. The Dallas
Museum of Art “recently celebrated one hundred years of connecting art
and people. Established in 1903, the Museum features an outstanding collection of more than 23,000 works of art from around the world, from
ancient to modern times.”290 Moreover, the Dallas Museum is supported
279. Mozart Opera Cancelled over Severed ‘God’ Heads, CANADA.COM, (Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=8379aa1f-2100-4605-9ffd2177103e8ecd.
280. See Donal Henahan, Met Opera: ‘Idomeneo’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1982), http://
www.nytimes.com/1982/10/15/arts/met-opera-idomeneo.html.
281. Id.
282. Mozart, supra, note 279.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Opera Canceled Over Depiction of Muhammad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/world/europe/27germany.html?_r=0.
(“The cancellation of the performances fanned a debate in Europe about whether the
West is compromising values like free expression to avoid stoking anger in the Muslim
world.”).
287. Mozart, supra note 279.
288. Ralph Blumenthal, Museum Field Trip Deemed Too Revealing: Texas Art Teacher
Suspended After a Parent Complains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A9, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/education/30teacher.html.
289. See generally Art, DALLAS MUSEUM OF ART, https://www.dma.org/art.
290. Dallas Museum of Art, SAATCHI GALLERY, http://www.saatchigallery.com/museums/museum-profile/Dallas+Museum+Of+Art/131.html.
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not only by private donations but is intimately tied to local government; it
is “supported in part by the generosity of DMA Partners and donors, the
citizens of Dallas through the City of Dallas Office of Cultural Affairs, and
the Texas Commission on the Arts.”291 “Over the past decade, more than
half a million students. . . have toured the museum’s collection.”292 But all
of this meant nothing in the face of parental outrage. And what was the
source of this outrage? The suspension letter to the teacher stated that
“[d]uring a study trip that you planned for fifth graders, students were
exposed to nude statues and other nude art representations.”293 And,
indeed, they may well have been exposed to, for example, the “marble torso
of a Greek youth from a funerary relief, circa 330 B.C.”294
In both cases, important institutional actors took extreme action by
suspending a teacher and canceling an opera because of a single complaint
or a single threat based on offense. In both cases, high culture fell to single
expressions of offense or threats of violence based on such offense. In both
cases important institutional actors may disavow the importance of culture
in the face of offense. In a sense there is an inversion here. Where once one
might speak of socially approved offense in the face of cultural boorishness, now the reverse seems to be true— there is a move to a socially
approved sense of offense in the face of the “arrogance” of high culture to
reflect something other than the boorish tastes of the least educated, or of
cultural strangers. Where culture becomes inverted, will law not quickly
follow? We might find it galling sometimes to be led from the top, but consider the effects of being led from the bottom; we may not like where we
wind up.295 And indeed, such an inversion might portend decadence more
than cultural vigor in culture as well as in law.296
When a political community abandons its own culture, when it ceases
to affirm its own ideals expressed through cultural symbols— pictures,
speech, music and the like— it begins to express an altogether different
value: a desire for self-destruction or its acceptance.297 The events I relate
above do not appear connected, yet they are the product of the same set of
impulses. That impulse was nicely summarized recently in a criticism of
the Western response to the violence that accompanied the so-called Danish cartoon controversy. Professor Hassen is critical in an interesting way:
The real hypocrites in the debate were liberal intellectuals, too many to
name, who spent years denouncing Christian fundamentalist demands for
prayer and the teaching of evolution, in schools, the censorship of books and
films, and limits on abortion, only to cave to fundamentalist Muslim
291. DALLAS MUSEUM OF ART, https://www.dma.org.
292. Blumenthal, supra note 288.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE (New York: Routledge
1989).
296. See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, POPULAR CULTURE AND HIGH CULTURE (rev. & updated)
55– 63 (New York Basic Books, 1999).
297. See, e.g., Claudio Lomnitz, Decadence in Times of Globalization, 92(2) Cultural
Anthropology 257– 67 (1994).
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demands for the introduction of Shari’a law, for separate swimming classes
for boys and girls, and— in the Danish case— for the respect of religious rules
not only by members of the religious group but by the society at large. . . .
That liberal intellectuals could be so absolutist in their dismissal of demands
made by Christian fundamentalists but so apologist and relativist in their
indulgence of those made by Muslim fundamentalists beggars belief.298

Clearly Professor Hassen suggests another wrinkle in the crisis of liberal secularism, one evidenced by the quite distinct treatment of non-Western religions from Christianity and Judaism. Beyond the underlying racism
is both a fear of violence that cannot be controlled effectively, and a perverse multicultural sensibility in which “foreign” or “exotic” religions are
privileged to a far greater extent than indigenous religion.299 This form of
what he characterizes as liberal hypocrisy may also be shared by a substantial portion of the political and media elites in the West.300 Indeed, disciplining Western norms through an application of an offense or provocation
standard tends to serve as a means of marginalizing one set of values for
another, which might in turn trigger a violent response.301 Indeed, inversion tends to follow, as the Turkish President, in the wake of the Charlie
Hebdo killings, suggested that the magazine itself engaged in acts of
terror.302
298. Randall Hassen, The Danish Cartoon Controversy: A Defense of Liberal Freedom,
European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Review 19(2):1, 5 (Spring 2006), available
at http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~rhansen/Current_Projects_files/danishcartoon.pdf.
(“Portraying the prophet may be prohibited for Muslims, but it is not and cannot be for
anyone else. Muslims may ask that others respect their religious precepts, but they cannot demand it any more than observant Jews can demand that their fellow citizens not
shop on Saturdays or Christians can demand that non-believers respect their sexual
mores.”).
299. See, e.g., id.
300. Thus, for example, when commenting on the 2015 executions of individuals at
Charlie Hebdo in Paris, Pope Francis I, echoing comments from others, suggested that
“while violent reaction is never the answer, people should not be making fun of other
people’s faith. The pope made these comments while on a plane with reporters heading
to the Philippines. Referring to an aide who organizes trips for him, Pope Francis said,
“You cannot react violently, but if Mr. Gasparri, my great friend, says a curse word
against my mother, he can expect a punch, this is normal.”“ Pope on Charlie Hebdo: It’s a
Provocation to Make Fun of People’s Faith, MEDIA, Jan. 15, 2015, available at http://www
.mediaite.com/online/pope-on-charlie-hebdo-its-a-provocation-to-make-fun-of-peoplesfaith/. See also, Richard Falk, Pope Francis, Salman Rushdie and Charlie Hebdo, AL
JAZEERA, Jan. 17, 2015, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/
01/pope-francis-salman-rushdie-char-20151176461502319.html.
301. That, certainly might be one way of reading the Turkish Prime Minister’s call for
Western restraint by seeking to suppress reprinting of Charlie Hebdo cartoons by a
Turkish press. “Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has strongly criticized daily Cumhuriyet for reprinting the Charlie Hebdo cartoon featuring the Prophet Muhammad, saying freedom of expression “does not grant anybody the right to insult another’s believes.
Cumhuriyet’s move to print a selection of Charlie Hebdo caricatures has “nothing to do
with freedom of expression,” Davutoğlu said on Jan. 15. Turkish PM Calls Reprinting of
Charlie Hebdo Cartoons ‘Deliberate Provocation,’ DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 2015, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-calls-reprinting-of-charlie-hebdo-car
toons-deliberate-provocation.aspx?pageID=238&nid=76983&NewsCatID=338.
302. “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has lashed out at Charlie Hebdo, the
French satirical magazine, for its “provocative” publications about Islam, saying the
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The point is easily extended to the Berlin opera’s unfortunate decision
to cancel a performance of a venerable Mozart opera. But it applies with
equal force to the self censorship and fear that is generated by domestic
fundamentalists who would undo centuries of cultural development, development on which their political, social, moral, and even religious privilege
rests. The same decadence that drives the director of the Berlin opera to
cancel an operatic performance also drives a school administration to
essentially forbid student viewing of representational art that has spanned
millennia. In one case, the West denies itself a continued renewal of its
cultural ties to music and expression, and in the other the West forbids the
education of its children in its own cultural fundamentals. A society that
rejects its own cultural basis for existence, or a community that forbids its
children an education in its own past, is one that is easy prey for other
political and cultural communities that have a greater attachment to their
own identity. Western society appears to value this less in the 21st century;
perhaps it suggests a rejection of those core values inherent in its own culture in favor of something else in the long cultural struggle that became
increasingly ferocious at the turn of this century.303
It is also worth considering whether the conceptual solicitude for religion in pluralist societies creates an impossible situation, one grounded in
the conflation between the political sanctity of belief and its protection
with the freedom of institutional actors, including religious institutional
actors, to participate freely in the political life of the state. Where an institutional actor and its adherents may participate in the political life of the
state for the purpose of transposing and protecting its religious views, practices, beliefs, and the like, but may also take advantage of legal protections
based precisely on the religious beliefs, practices etc. that are the subject of
their political agenda, then the existential crisis is complete.304 The secular liberalism that produced this contradiction will necessarily collapse
into the politics of religious privilege within the apparatus of the state. One
gets a sense of this from the visit of then-Pope Benedict XVI to Latin
America in 2007.305
On May 10, 2007, Pope Benedict XVI traveled to Brazil.306 The visit
was a homecoming, though not in the usual sense. While he had not visited
weekly paper incites hatred and racism . . . ‘This is not called freedom. This equates to
wreaking terror by intervening in the freedom space of others. We should be aware of
this. There is no limitless freedom,’ he said.” Erdogan lashes out at Charlie Hebdo magazine, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 16, 2015, available http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/
2015/01/erdogan-lashes-out-at-charlie-hebdo-magazine-201511616465336139.html.
303. See, e.g., JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE
FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (New York, Basic Books, 1992);
JONATHAN ZIMMERMAN, WHOSE AMERICA? CULTURE WARS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Harvard
University Press, 2005).
304. See generally Backer, supra note 5.
305. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Law: Benedict XVI and the Constitution of Political States, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, (Jun. 7, 2007), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2007/06/law.html.
306. See Papa: polı́ticos pró-aborto podem ser excomungados, O GLOBO (May 10, 2007),
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/PapanoBrasil/0,,MUL33664-8524,00.html; Ministro diz
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Brazil in person, the Pope had visited Brazil in an intellectual sense. His
visit provided an opportunity to tour the site of Benedict’s greatest triumph
as Cardinal Ratzinger about 30 years earlier— a triumph that might well
have secured him his future at the Vatican.307
Brazil had been a hotbed of liberation theology, a form of engagement
between Catholicism, social action, and the state that had energized many
parts of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s.308 In some parts of Latin
America it caused its adherents, priests as well as lay Catholics, to challenge not only the secular leadership of the state, but the leadership of the
Church itself.309 Benedict’s contribution to the dissipation of that movement within Catholicism, at least as an intellectually vibrant aspect of
Catholic social thought, and the suppression of its foundational norms as
heretical, is well-known.310 The basis of Ratzinger’s attack was that liberation theology was unacceptable not because of its inherent totalitarianism
but because of its essentially Godless totalitarianism. “ ‘The message of the
Gospel cannot be reduced to politics. Nevertheless, the Gospel has certainly political consequences,” the Cardinal explained.311 These efforts,
combined with his earlier theological work, helped cement his ties with the
new Pope John Paul II,312 who was himself on a crusade against the godless
totalitarianism in Poland and the rest of the Stalinist Soviet Bloc313 that
ultimately may have played a role in his securing the bishopric of Rome.314
But the attack on Liberation Theology was also grounded in more positive aspects. These principally touched on issues of solidarity within the
communion of the faithful.315 The meaning, exercise, and obligations of
that communion, and the penalties for rejection of faith, of living in solidarnão temer excomunhão, O GLOBO, (May 9, 2007), http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/noblat/
posts/2007/05/09/ministro-diz-nao-temer-excomunhao-57512.asp.
307. See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II
459– 64 (Cliff Street Books, 1999).
308. Two of the foundational works of the movement were GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A
THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SALVATION, 15th anniversary ed.,
(Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, trans., Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988; 1st ed., Maryknoll:
Orbis, 1973) (Originally published as Teologı́a de la liberación: Perspectivas (Lima: CEP,
1971) and LEONARDO BOFF AND CLODOVIS BOFF, INTRODUCING LIBERAITON THEOLOGY
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987).
309. For a history of Liberation theology, see, e.g., CHRISTIAN SMITH, THE EMERGENCE
OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY: RADICAL RELIGION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 150– 222
(University of Chicago Press, 1991).
310. See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger & Alberto Bovone, Instruction on Certain Aspects
of the Theology of Liberation, CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH (Aug. 6,
1984), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_
cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html.
311. Cardinal Ratzinger To Review Liberation Theology In Mexico, CATHOLIC CULTURE
.ORG (May 9, 1996), http://www.catholicculture.org/news/features/index.cfm?recnum=
474.
312. See, e.g., George Weigel, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II
244, 442– 44 (Cliff Street Books, 1999).
313. See, e.g., id at 459– 464; Jane Barnes & Helen Whitney, John Paul II and the Fall of
Communism, PBS Frontline, available http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
pope/communism/.
314. Id.
315. See Ratzinger & Bovone, supra note 310.
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ity with the faithful, were well-developed in Ratzinger’s attack.316 The success of these attacks can be seen today in Brazil: “[i]n Brazil, though,
liberation theology is far from dead. These days, instead of preaching class
struggle and defying dictators, many veterans of the movement have
adapted their rhetoric and role to the times. They work to promote environmental conservation or women’s rights; they help the homeless and AIDS
patients.”317 Liberation Theology has been tamed, and now may find its
way into the heart of the Roman Magisterium itself with the ascension of
Pope Francis I in 2014.318
This background is critically important when one attempts to understand Benedict’s trip to Brazil, and the statements that he carefully chose to
make there. Benedict chose Brazil not only to gloat about the transformation of the force of liberation theology, but also to refine the points he
made so effectively against Liberation Theology319 (and where better than
in the place of its greatest potency?). That point can be described simply as
solidarity. Benedict used his visit to Brazil to emphasize the contours of the
behavior necessary to show solidarity with the Church— what are, in other
words, the minimum requirements for “being” Catholic.320
Though felt in a particular way within Catholicism, the ideas of solidarity in the management of the integrity of communities and its self-conception provide important lessons to all governance communities in a
transnational world. That solidarity focuses on the nature of the community— evangelization— and its organization, which is hierarchical and
demands a certain amount of fidelity and obedience. “All priests, religious,
and lay people who hear this call for justice and who want to work for
evangelization and the advancement of mankind, will do so in communion
with their bishop and with the Church, each in accord with his or her own
specific ecclesial vocation. . . . Aware of the ecclesial character of their vocation, theologians will collaborate loyally and with a spirit of dialogue with
the Magisterium of the Church. They will be able to recognize in the Magisterium a gift of Christ to His Church and will welcome its word and its
directives with filial respect.”321 “It has to do with a challenge to the ‘sacramental and hierarchical structure’ of the Church, which was willed by the
Lord Himself.”322
316. Id.
317. Monte Reel, An Abiding Faith in Liberation Theology, WASH. POST (May 2, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/01/AR2005050100
821.html.
318. Pope Francis I: Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio named new Pope, BALTIMORE NEWS
JOURNAL (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.baltimorenewsjournal.com/2013/03/13/popefrancis-i-cardinal-jorge-mario-bergoglio-named-new-pope/.
319. See Ratzinger & Bovone, supra note 310, and Instruction on Christian Freedom
and Liberation, CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, (April 17, 1986).
320. James Carroll, The pope’s ‘culture of solidarity,’ BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/08/04/pope-francis-culture-solidarityhints-change-and-not-just-for-church/TxIBcNcrXwHaiwiakC3lxH/story.html.
321. Ratzinger & Bovone, supra note 310.
322. Id., at pt. IX, para 13.
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And contrary to the usual course for Benedict, he chose praxis over
theological discourse to emphasize his points. “In this sense, it is necessary
to affirm that one becomes more aware of certain aspects of truth by starting with ‘praxis’, if by that one means pastoral ‘praxis’ and social work
which keeps its evangelical inspiration.”323 Thus, it should have come as
no surprise that Benedict issued a statement, even as he was flying into
Brazil, that he supported the position of the Mexican bishops who had
threatened to excommunicate Mexican politicians who voted in favor of the
legalization of abortion within Mexico City.324 When the Brazilian Health
Minister, himself a Catholic, was asked about the threat of excommunication for officials that acted contrary to the will of the Magisterium of the
Church, he responded with “a fé não pode ser excommungada” (faith cannot be excommunicated).325
It seems that Benedict had the better of this dialogue with the Health
Minister. No community can retain autonomy without both a sense of
those characteristics that make it different from others, and the willingness
to enforce communal boundaries. If it means anything to be a Catholic, it
means to be a Catholic through practiced faith— that is, through faith “on
the ground.” There can be no higher calling in a system in which God sits
at the top of a system guarded by its disciples. Disobedience must be disciplined, and a serious disobedience might well merit expulsion from the
body of the faithful.326 In matters of faith, political officials in Mexico
must pay heed to Rome even as they act as representatives of the people of
a variety of faith communities. Benedict has thus been right to suggest that
he would rather have a smaller community of truly faithful than a larger
community of faithless. Certainly the Jews have proven the lasting power of
such choices for grounding communal solidarity, as well as the risks.
In effect, Benedict rejects the notion of a “soft Catholicism” in the
same way that many in the Muslim world have rejected a version of “soft
Islam.” Benedict suggests, and from his perspective not incorrectly, that
faith is the paramount community, and that the obligation of the faithful
must seamlessly conform to its requisites in all of the individual’s actions—
both personal and representational. One can only represent others in a
political system by being true to the tenets of one’s faith obligations. Thus,
an individual cannot wear multiple hats, as individual and as representative of the people, and remain true to his faith. And in this faith, of course,
the nature of both personal and representational obligations is subject to
the mandatory guidance of the Church’s Magisterium. For Benedict, this
represents no conflict with democratic values. Yet the political consequences of this stance are clearly visible in Marxist-Leninist states, like
323. Id.
324. Pope arrives in Brazil with tough abortion stance, USA TODAY (May 10, 2007),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-05-09-pope-brazil_N.htm.
325. See Papa apóia excomunhão de politicos pró aborto, FOLHA DE S. PAULO (May 10,
2007).
326. See Auguste Boudinhon, Excommunication, The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 5
(2012), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05678a.htm.
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China, where the secular government understands the role of religion in
disciplining its members and organizing its institutional structures as
essentially political and potentially adverse to the sovereign powers of
states.327 In that respect he mirrors the theological perspective of so-called
political Islam, both of which would marginalize secular or multi-normative systems.328 Yet perspective matters. And from the perspective of those
who must share a democratic political system with the faith of “hard” religion, the loss of representational power might be deeply felt, especially
when the values of the Magisterium become translated into mandatory
obligations in secular law.
But in the absence of a complete monopoly of the faithful and the
corresponding power to control conformity with its obligations, and in the
context of the current system that is trending toward universal tolerance of
faith communities (and the right to choose among them), any “victory” of
hard political religion, such as that suggested by Benedict, is perverse. For
in the absence of a complete correlation between the community of
Catholics and other faith communities, and in the absence of viable faith
alternatives for individuals, the reality of enforcement of faith boundaries
through expulsion cannot have the effect it might have 1000 years ago. In
this sense, “faith” cannot be excommunicated— excommunication is separation from the body of believers. But faith extends beyond the body of
believers. And faith to the precepts of other communities may require obedience every bit as strong as that to the body of the faithful. Thus, faithfulness to the political community may require faithlessness to the
community of the faithful— at least to the extent that faith communities
seeks to universalize its mores over the body of different believers. Benedict
reminds us of the binding power of solidarity to the constitution and community, as well as its viability. The Health Minister reminds us that in a
world of multiple global communities of faith, solidarity has its limits. As
long as a variety of communities of faith, political, and economic communities compete more or less on an equal plane, the individual may chose
freely from among them for the satisfaction of his earthly and otherworldly
needs. But he also reveals the risks— authority and legitimacy may be
adversely affected by the migration from one group to another. In a transnational world, the multiple pull of solidarity will add a certain level of
complexity to governance.

327. See Joan Frawley Desmond, Pope Francis on China: ‘I am Ready to Go There,’
NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER, Jan. 22, 2015, available at http://www.ncregister.com/
daily-news/pope-francis-on-china-i-am-ready-to-go-there/.
328. See Omayma Abdel-Latif, Harmonising immutable values and ever-changing mechanisms, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Iss. No. 716, (Nov. 11– 17, 2014), http://weekly
.ahram.org.eg/2004/716/focus.htm (interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, chief advisor to
the Turkish AK Party, and referencing Mr. Davutoglu’s book democratic political
theory).
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Conclusion
The existential crisis for secular liberalism in Western states is one of
its own making. It is produced by an unhealthy conflation of solicitude for
religion and a willingness to allow institutional religion a role in the political life of the state. It is not possible to contain religion within the private
realm while law circulates freely in the public realm of reason, and the
converse is impossible as well. Likewise, seeking refuge in the notions of a
benign faith in contradistinction with a more muscular law belies the reality that faith communities are governance organs that do have a habit of
seeking to impose their faith-based values on others through the guise of
politics and through law. The resulting contradiction is unavoidable and
creates the sort of instability experienced in varying degrees in different
states that seek to harmonize a plural regime while privileging religion.
The problem is neither faith nor reason, but rather the clash of institutional
power represented by two law generating apparatus— those of the state and
those of religion. Where there is a convergence of both, then the political
and religious policy merge. But in multi-religious states there will be an
asymmetry and a vertical arrangement of power relationships grounded on
religious power as expressed through the mechanics of mass democracy.
The problem is particularly acute in democratic states built around
sharp political contests. Individual belief and its protection are not the
problem, but institutional systems built around beliefs complicate governance. The effects are most acute in states that are substantially religiously
homogenous, and the consequences are most in evidence outside the West.
That problem is in turn compounded by a solicitude for religion that
extends protection for religious political convictions that are unavailable to
others competing in the robust marketplace of politics and ideas. That is
the underlying difficulty of cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.329 The
nature of the shocks to the constitutional settlement of the U.S. Constitution and its now-misunderstood model of secularism, which touches on the
nature and application of the rule of law, the nature and limits of direct
democracy, the relationship between apostasy and treason, the language of
interpretation and the power to participate in that dialogue, and the role of
the foreign or minority remains to be seen. For secular liberalism, the price
of preserving the privileging of the practices and autonomy of religion by
the state is the disbarring of institutional religion (though not religious
values) from organized political life. The alternative, privileging (institutional) religion and permitting it a broad institutional right to participate
in politics, is very much in evidence abroad.

329. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). But see Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, (October 30, 2014) HARV. L. REV (forthcoming) (U. Ala.
Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 2516853), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2516853.

